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INTRODUCTION
In the helter-skelter of daily life, we are constantly
exposed to situations that may impact our physical health and
emotional well-being. They vary from the mundane, such as
inhaling a cloud of exhaust from a truck while crossing the
street or a jostle by a fellow passenger in a crowded train, to
the devastating, such as observing a close friend suffer from an
illness. Tort law does not provide a means to financially recover
for these types of common events or inconveniences that are an
ordinary part of life.1 Likewise, state consumer protection
1 See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEEETON] (recognizing that tort law does not provide
a remedy for “unkindness” or violations of “the golden rule”).
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statutes, while relaxing some elements required for common
law fraud claims, were not intended to provide a refund to
people whose purchase had no connection to an allegedly
deceptive label or advertisement.2
Generally, a plaintiff must show a physical injury or
demonstrate, in an objective and meaningful way, that he or she
experienced a financial loss as a result of a defendant’s conduct.3
This is the case because, over time, the law has developed
critical safeguards against claims that are either speculative or
that courts are ill-equipped to address or compensate. Such
foundational requirements ensure that the court system is not
overwhelmed with lawsuits based on what might or could occur,
diverting judicial time and the financial resources of those
named in such suits from cases involving actual, current
injuries. Tort and consumer law reserve liability to objectively
verifiable, genuine harms. At a very minimum, Article III
standing requires an “injury in fact,” that the injury is “fairly
trace[able]” to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury
will “likely . . . [be] redressed by a favorable decision.”4
The significance of making inroads on such threshold
requirements is not lost on plaintiffs’ lawyers who, like members
of other professions, make their living by finding both new clients
and new ways to expand their business. As a prominent plaintiffs’
lawyer (who would want to remain anonymous) candidly told one
of the authors:
If there were liability for every physical injury or actual economic
harm that occurs in America, I still would be limited in my practice.
There are only so many injuries. But if I were allowed to recover
damages and attorneys’ fees when there is no injury, my potential
return is unlimited.

This experienced plaintiffs’ lawyer and others may be on
the way to fulfilling this goal. In recent years, plaintiffs’
lawyers are increasingly asserting “no-injury” theories in the
courts. These types of claims have become so frequent that the
American Tort Reform Foundation coined the phrase “empty

2 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 18-21, 50-54 (2005) (finding that most
state consumer protection statutes or courts interpreting them require showing an
ascertainable loss and some require a showing of reliance).
3 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 165 (“Actual loss or damage
resulting to the interests of another [is a necessary element of a negligence cause of
action] . . . . The threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough.”).
4 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (first
alteration in original).
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suit litigation”™ to describe them.5 These are claims in which
the harm to the attorneys’ clients (or class members) is illusory.
They either seek recovery for speculative present or future
“injuries” or rely upon a fictitious construct of an economic loss
that is a creative invention of expert testimony.
This Article focuses on four variants of no-injury theories
that are either emerging or experiencing a resurgence in the
courts: (1) claims for recovery of emotional harm; (2) liability for
the estimated costs of medical monitoring following exposure to a
potentially harmful substance absent a physical injury; (3) class
action litigation claiming that a product’s actual value was lower
than the purchase price or that the resale value of a product
diminished because of an alleged latent defect, even when the
product functioned properly for most or all consumers; and
(4) class actions challenging product labeling or advertising on
behalf of all consumers where few, if any, of them were actually
misled.6 In each area, the Article reviews applicable tort law
principles, examines how plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent
or alter the traditional rule to proceed with no-injury lawsuits,
and considers the judicial response to such claims.
The Article finds that some courts are slowly easing
traditional requirements for recovery solely for emotional harm
and a new Restatement is likely to advance this process. With
respect to other types of claims, courts are largely rejecting empty
suit litigation. When courts dismiss these types of claims, the
ground for doing so varies significantly: lack of standing, failure to
state a claim, federal preemption, and failure to meet class
certification requirements are among the most common bases. It
appears that while judges recognize that these claims violate
fundamental principles of law, they are struggling to find a proper
basis to dismiss them. Some lawsuits have settled for significant
sums. For that reason and the persistence of lawyers who try to
expand tort and consumer law, this litigation is likely to continue.
In its essence, this Article supports the view that the
civil justice system should be reserved for individuals who have
experienced real injuries and actual losses. Courts can discourage
empty suit litigation by requiring objective proof of injury,
5 U.S. Trademark Application, Serial No. 86,338,065 (filed July 15, 2014),
available at http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4803:w70pvg.3.1.
6 Some data privacy claims present another example of emerging no-injury
litigation. See, e.g., Tabata v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 759 S.E.2d 459, 467 (W. Va.
2014) (reversing dismissal of data privacy class action where class members had “no
evidence of unauthorized access of their personal and medical information, no evidence of
actual identity theft, and no evidence of economic injury arising from the alleged
wrongdoing”); see id. (Ketchum, J., dissenting) (referring to the case as a “typical example of
a frivolous class-action lawsuit” and declaring “[n]o harm, no foul”).
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carefully applying safeguards governing class certification and
expert testimony, and, when warranted, sanctioning lawyers who
knowingly file meritless claims. Government agencies should
address safety concerns before injuries occur and provide clear
rules for businesses on the use of marketing terms that can have
different meanings for different people, such as “natural”
ingredients. Regulators have the tools to be more efficient and
effective than courts in responding to potential threats and
developing public policy. When necessary, legislatures should step
in to put the brakes on litigation that leads to unpredictable and
inconsistent outcomes for businesses, harms consumers through
higher prices, reduces consumer choice, and damages respect
for the legal system.
I.

LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS FOR EMOTIONAL HARM

Claims to recover for purely an emotional harm, i.e. in
absence of physical injury or manifestation of harm, open the
door to empty suit litigation. The reasons for this are easy to
understand. Emotional harm, broadly construed, is quite
subjective. Where this area of law lacks clear lines, it is easy to
exaggerate or even imagine claims. Every day we are all subject
to emotional harm, anxiety, grief, or distress. We narrowly avoid
a car accident with a distracted driver. We slip and nearly fall
down a wet stairway in a parking garage. At the end of the day,
when we are finally at home, an announcement on the television
tells us that a drug we take is now associated with a painful
form of cancer. Although these incidents may cause us to feel
genuine emotional distress, should such feelings or concerns be
the predicate for a tort claim?
These events are a part of everyday life, but the last
example highlights another problem with emotional harm cases.
They can be widespread. In the drug example, assume that the
product led to cancer in approximately a thousand patients, but
over a million people who took the drug learned about the
potential harm. Should all of those people have claims for
negligent infliction of emotional harm? Bold and frightening
advertising to recruit plaintiffs for lawsuits could itself cause
emotional distress to some viewers who might otherwise be calm.
Professors William L. Prosser and John W. Wade, who
wrote the Restatement (Second) of Torts, appreciated these
concerns. They handled the issue of emotional harm in simple
black letter. There was no recovery for negligent infliction of
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emotional distress7 (as contrasted with intentional infliction of
emotional harm).8
There were historic exceptions to this black letter rule, but
they were very limited in scope. A telegraph company (long before
e-mail) might be subject to liability for negligent infliction of
emotional harm if it transcribed a telegraph that had been sent
by a hospital to a parent to say that a person’s child “was well,”
but, through the negligence of the telegram operator, told the
recipient parent of the telegram that his child was dead. The
parent could successfully sue the telegraph company for emotional
harm.9 Another long-standing exception in this category recognized
an independent claim for mental suffering against funeral
directors and others if they mishandled a close relative’s body, for
example, if a coffin in a closed ceremony popped open in the
middle of a service, or if the body in the coffin was not a loved
one’s relative, but a stranger.10 These exceptions to the bar on
recovery for pure emotional harm had a clear objective factual
basis. There was little room for fraud, or abuse, of the tort system,
or an influx of subjective claims that would consume the judicial
system and deplete resources available for cases involving
physical injuries or objectively measurable economic losses. The
numbers of claims were tightly circumscribed by the facts.
The American Law Institute created the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 50 years ago.11 Since that time, courts have
opened the door with respect to negligent infliction of emotional
harm claims. The Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm (Restatement Third), displays a
rainbow of rules as to when and how plaintiffs may have a viable
claim for emotional harm.12 As explained below, the Restatement
Third’s “window” for claims based on negligent infliction of
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
See id. § 46 (recognizing a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
9 See, e.g., Mentzer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 62 N.W. 1, 6 (Iowa 1895)
(recognizing claim for negligently failing to deliver a telegram notifying plaintiff of the
death of his mother).
10 See Gray Brown-Service Mortuary, Inc. v. Lloyd, 729 So. 2d 280, 285 (Ala.
1999) (“It has long been the law of Alabama that mistreatment of burial places and
human remains will support the recovery of damages for mental suffering.”); see also,
e.g., Lott v. State, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (recognizing claim for emotional distress
where bodies of two women, one Jewish and one Catholic, who died during the same hour,
were mistakenly switched, prepared in violation of religious beliefs, and presented to the
family due to hospital error); cf. Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182
(Civ. Ct. 1979) (awarding $700 in damages for emotional distress where organization
substituted dead cat in casket for beloved pet dog whose body was wrongfully disposed).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§§ 47-48 (2012).
7

8
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emotional harm is a rather wide one, but it does place certain
restrictions on the tort that represent sound public policy.
A.

Traditional Limits on Emotional Harm Claims

As courts began to recognize claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, they recognized that, without objective
constraints, the tort had the potential to spiral out of control,
providing a potential lawsuit to anyone with hurt feelings, fears, or
anxieties. As the Supreme Court observed, “courts have realized
that recognition of a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress holds out the very real possibility of nearly
infinite and unpredictable liability for defendants.”13 For these
reasons, courts developed a series of bright-line rules that limited
duty as a matter of public policy. While such lines are inherently
arbitrary, and are frequently criticized as such, some courts have
long viewed them as essential to maintaining rational bounds on
an expansive tort. Other courts have gradually relaxed these rules.
For example, for many years, in the jurisdictions that
allowed claims based on negligent infliction of emotional harm,
there had to be some contemporaneous physical contact
between the defendant and the plaintiff related to that alleged
harm. The physical impact, no matter how trivial and even if it
caused no real harm, was the “magic formula” that opened the
door to “the full joy of a complete recovery.”14 There remained no
recovery for mere fright, even if it had serious consequences.15
While this physical contact or impact rule was arbitrary in
nature, it did provide an objective limit on the tort. The beginning
of the end of the contact rule occurred in a well-known New York
Court of Appeals case where a ski resort employee negligently
placed a child in a chair lift without securing the child’s safety
belt and the child suffered emotional trauma.16 The court allowed
the claim, suggesting that whether or not a defendant had
physical contact with a plaintiff was not a useful screen to
discern between legitimate and non-legitimate emotional harm
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994).
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 363-64 (quoting Herbert F. Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 504 (1922) and providing
examples of impacts found by courts to permit recovery for emotional harm). A famous
example of such an “impact” is the case of a circus horse that “evacuated his bowels into [the
plaintiff ’ s] lap.” Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680, 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928).
15 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896) (requiring
immediate personal injury for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
finding that “nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way
changes the principle”).
16 Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 729 (N.Y. 1961) (overruling Mitchell,
45 N.E. 354).
13

14
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cases.17 While many jurisdictions followed this case in abandoning
the contact rule, a few jurisdictions still maintain it.18
Courts that abandoned the contact rule did not leap into
an open-ended standard for determining when claims might be
allowed for negligent infliction of emotional harm. They
formulated alternative rules that constrained direct emotional
harm claims. Some courts allowed recovery for emotional harm
where a person narrowly escaped a serious injury, but there was
no impact, and suffered illness or mental trauma as a result.19
This became known as the “zone-of-danger” test. Other courts
did not require, or dropped the requirement of, a near miss, but
required that a plaintiff prove that he or she suffered an objective
physical injury or manifestation as the result of emotional
distress that was proximately caused by the defendant’s negligent
conduct.20 This standard could be met, for example, by showing,
through competent medical evidence, that the plaintiff developed
an illness as a direct result of the incident.21 A physical
manifestation of the emotional harm serves as an “objective
determination [that] provides reasonable assurance that the
claim is not spurious.”22
Courts have placed, and continue to maintain, rigorous
restrictions on recovery for fear of developing an illness due to
potential exposure to a toxic substance. For example, the Maryland
Court of Appeals recently found that to recover for emotional
distress stemming from a fear of contracting a latent disease, a
plaintiff must show that:
(1) he or she was exposed actually to a toxic substance due to the
defendant’s tortious conduct; (2) which led him or her to fear
objectively and reasonably that he or she would contract a disease;
and (3) as a result of the objective and reasonable fear, he or she
manifested a physical injury capable of objective determination.23

17 See id. at 731 (reasoning that fraudulent accidents and injuries are just as
easily feigned in “slight-impact cases” as “no-impact cases”).
18 See, e.g., Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2000); Atl. Coast
Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989 (Ind. 2006).
19 See, e.g., Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (N.J. 1965) (pedestrian almost
struck by automobile); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 675-76 (Pa. 1979) (discussing the court’s
abandonment of the “impact rule” in favor of the “zone of . . . danger” theory).
20 See, e.g., Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 73 A. 688, 691 (Md. 1909); Daley
v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 390-91 (Mich. 1970).
21 See, e.g., Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. P’ship, 718 A.2d 1161,
1184 (Md. 1998).
22 Id. at 1184 (quoting Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found, 621 A.2d 872, 885
(Md. 1993)).
23 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30, 66 (Md. 2013) (reversing $1.5
billion verdict).
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The court drew these lines out of longstanding concern that
“emotional distress may be feigned easily” and the need to have
a “sufficient guarantee of genuineness that would otherwise be
absent in a claim for mental distress alone.”24
Almost all courts have drawn the line on emotional harm
claims stemming from negligent destruction of property. In most
states, there is no recovery for the emotional connection to
property beyond its actual value.25 One may have feelings about an
heirloom, or even an office chair, that has been used for decades.
Some people even give their automobiles personal names. Only a
handful of states, however, have allowed recovery for the “intrinsic”
or “special” value of property,26 or allow owners to seek sentimental
damages for the destruction of an heirloom.27 When they do so,
such considerations are used to arrive at an item’s economic worth
or actual value when the property’s market value is difficult to
discern, not to award emotional harm damages.28 When recognized,
these exceptions are tightly limited.29 For example, in the most
litigious area in which plaintiffs seek recovery for emotional harm
stemming from property damage, an injury to a pet, most courts
have taken this approach and not awarded damages for loss of
companionship or other emotional harm.30
Another example of judicial line drawing has occurred
with respect to claims by individuals who suffer grief or harm
due to the injury or death of another. These are cases involving
24 Id. at 59 (quoting Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 732 (Md. 1979) (discussing
Green, 73 A. 688 (Md. 1909)).
25 See, e.g., Price v. High Pointe Oil Co., 828 N.W.2d 660, 665-67, 673 (Mich.
2013) (reversing $100,000 award of emotional harm damages to plaintiff whose home was
destroyed and adhering to traditional common law rule “that the measure of damages for
the negligent destruction of property is the cost of replacement or repair”).
26 See Phil Goldberg, Courts and Legislatures Have Kept the Proper Leash on Pet
Injury Lawsuits: Why Rejecting Emotion-Based Damages Promotes The Rule of Law,
Modern Values, and Animal Welfare, 6 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 30, 50-53 (2013).
27 See, e.g., Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Brown v.
Frontier Theaters, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963); Bush v. State, 79 P.3d 1178 (Wyo.
2003); see generally Goldberg, supra note 26, at 53-54.
28 See City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 497 (Tex. 1997) (“The owner’s
feelings thus help determine the value of the destroyed item to the owner for purposes of
property, not mental anguish, damages.”).
29 See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. 2013) (recognizing that the
heirloom exception applies only when the sentimentality exists “at the time a keepsake is
acquired,” is “based not on the item’s attributes but rather on the nostalgia it evokes,” and is
“kept around chiefly to commemorate past events or passed family members”).
30 See id. While the reasoning of some courts in rejecting such claims is
somewhat automatic (pets are property, therefore, claims are not allowed), other courts
have been more expansive in their reasoning in explaining the adverse consequences,
or ripple effect, to society that would flow from allowing such claims. For example, the
cost of veterinary medicine would be sure to rise, and the cost of boarding animals could
skyrocket, or not be available at all. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird,
Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule,
33 PEPP. L. REV. 227 (2006).
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indirect, rather than direct, harm.31 Some courts have allowed
recovery for emotional distress when a person contemporaneously
observes the bodily injury or death of a close family member due
to a defendant’s negligence, known as the “bystander” rule.32
Perhaps the most expansive decision in this area was from the
Supreme Court of California. In Dillon v. Legg, the court allowed
a claim by a mother who learned of an accident involving her
child, suffered emotional harm, yet never witnessed the accident,
or was in the zone of danger herself.33 Courts soon learned the
lesson of stretching emotional harm claims too far. As a result of
Dillon, California courts were inundated with claims of people
who learned about serious accidents to their loved ones after,
or even well after, the time of the event. In Thing v. La Chusa,
the Supreme Court of California took a step back by limiting
indirect claims for emotional harm to close relatives that
contemporaneously witnessed bodily injury to a loved one that
had been negligently caused by the conduct of the defendant,
an automobile driver.34
B.

The Restatement Third Approach

The Restatement Third adopts positions that, if adopted
by courts following the traditional approaches, would relax the
objective criteria needed to recover for pure emotional harm
and other constraints on such claims applicable in several of
these areas.

31 State wrongful death acts carefully restrict the action with respect to recovery
for emotional harm. Most wrongful death acts limit an action to a spouse, parent, or child. A
few extend to siblings. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(d)(1) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 3724(a) (2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6(b) (West 2014); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.2922 (1961) (including siblings and grandparents). Many are interpreted by
courts or explicitly state that they do not permit recovery for the grief or anguish that
naturally accompanies a loss. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-1-2(c)(2)(A) (West 2014)
(explicitly precluding recovery for grief); MINN. STAT. § 573.02(1) (2014) (limiting recovery to
pecuniary loss); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-7 (2014) (same); Lengel v. New Haven Gas Light
Co., 111 A.2d 547, 551 (Conn. 1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1982); Pagitt v.
City of Keokuk, 206 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Iowa 1973); Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 215 (N.J.
1980); Gonzalez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 572 N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (N.Y. 1991); Knowles v.
Corkill, 51 P.3d 859, 863-64 (Wyo. 2002).
32 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (recognizing a cause of
action for emotional distress on the part of a mother who had seen her child being struck
and killed by a negligently operated automobile that did not endanger the mother and
providing criteria for recovery in bystander suits). But cf. Maloney v. Conroy, 545 A.2d
1059, 1064 (Conn. 1988) (dismissing claim of plaintiff who claimed emotional disturbance
from observing medical malpractice performed on mother, holding “‘there can be no
recovery for nervous shock and mental anguish caused by the sight of injury or
threatened harm to another’” (quoting Strazza v. McKittrick, 156 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1959))).
33 See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912.
34 See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989).
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For example, the Restatement Third embraces an openended standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
specifically stating that a plaintiff does not have to show
objective physical consequences if he or she showed “serious
emotional harm . . . in the course of specified categories of
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent
conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”35
In so doing, it endorses a minority approach and discards the
physical manifestation requirement.36 The new Restatement will
likely influence additional courts to take this approach.
The authors of the Restatement Third view the “test” as
not overly subjective or open-ended.37 They indicate that requiring
that plaintiff show that the defendant’s conduct is such that “a
reasonable person would suffer serious [emotional] harm” is a
sufficient threshold to weed out overly subjective claims.38
Nevertheless, that standard contains highly subjective
words. What is “reasonable?” What is “serious?” What are the
“specified categories” of activities, left unspecified by the black
letter rule, to which this liability applies?39 Moreover, the
Restatement Third went further in tilting toward subjectivity and
indicated that if the reasonable person threshold were met, “a
person may recover for all harm subjectively suffered, even if that
suffering is greater than an ordinary person’s because of a
predisposition or special vulnerability.”40 This is the so-called
“thin skull” rule that may be fair when a plaintiff suffers a
physical injury. When it is applied to emotional harm cases,
however, it overreaches. To put this in graphic terms, if a
defendant’s negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm
that might cause a “reasonable” person to have bad dreams, or
be so traumatized that he misses a day or two of work, the
Restatement could be interpreted to allow a highly subjective
idiosyncratic individual to obtain damages who claims (with
“expert” proof) that he is unable to work for the rest of his life.
With regard to fear of future injury, the Restatement
Third cuts the baby in two. It suggests that courts allow claims
35 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47
(2012). The Restatement also incorporates the zone-of-danger test as a basis for recovery
for emotional harm. See id. § 47(a).
36 See id. § 47 cmt. j.
37 See id.
38 Id.
39 The comments to the Restatement recognize that “[c]ourts have not provided
clear guidelines to identify precisely which activities, undertakings, or relationships will
support liability” and there is “considerable variation” even in areas “fraught with risk of
emotional harm.” See id. § 47 cmt. f.
40 Id. § 47 cmt. l.
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where the fear of future harm is short range in nature, such as
HIV contact, where a person discovers soon after exposure
whether he or she has contracted the disease.41 The Restatement
Third, however, does not allow emotional harm claims when the
“fear” and reality are potentially years away, for example, where
a person was exposed to asbestos.42 Like other rules and
comments on this general topic put forth by the Restatement
Third (and some courts), the borderline potential of empty suit
litigation becomes cloudy when applied to specific facts. What
is long range and what is short range?
One area in which the Restatement Third continues to
closely follow the traditional rule is with respect to emotional harm
claims based on negligent harm to property. The Restatement
Third draws a clear line, stating that “emotional harm resulting
from negligently caused harm to personal property is not
permitted,”43 including injuries to pets.44 While the Restatement
recognizes that “pets are often quite different from other chattels
in terms of emotional attachment” and that harm to pets “can
cause real and serious emotional harm in some cases,” the
Reporters understood that “lines—arbitrary at times—that limit
recovery for emotional harm are necessary.”45
With respect to indirect claims for emotional harm, the
Restatement Third follows the approach of Thing v. La Chusa. It
limits claims to close relatives that contemporaneously witnessed
bodily injury to a loved one that had been negligently caused by
the conduct of the defendant.46 At least eleven jurisdictions are
more restrictive, however, and only allow bystander recovery
when the plaintiff is in the zone of danger.47
C.

Judges Can Avoid Expansion

Emotional harm claims are in constant danger of
entering the zone of empty suit litigation. Courts need to retain
limits through objective rules of law even though they may
have some arbitrariness about them. Manifestation of a
physical injury exemplifies this type of limitation. Of equal
Id. § 47 cmt. k.
Id.
43 See id. § 47 cmt. m.
44 Id. (concluding that “an actor who negligently injures another’s pet is not
liable for emotional harm suffered by the pet’s owner”).
45 Id.
46 See id. § 48.
47 See id. § 48, reporters’ note, cmt. a (citing case law of Arizona, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Dakota,
Utah, and Vermont).
41

42
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importance is the role of the judge in limiting expert testimony
to those who are absolutely qualified to apply it in a specific
case. While science has significantly advanced in determining
mental illness and emotional suffering, undue flexibility with
expert witnesses with respect to negligently caused emotional
harm claims can flood our courts with litigation that exhausts
assets that are best preserved for victims of serious physical
harms. Judges should exercise the highest degree of oversight
with respect to an “expert’s” testimony who claims that a
plaintiff suffers from a recognized medical condition and that
the defendant’s conduct or product caused that harm. Further,
judges should exercise great scrutiny in determining the
legitimacy of a claim, regardless of the particular legal rule
that may allow such claims.
As the Restatement Third makes clear, “[d]etermination
of which activities, undertakings, or relationships support
recovery for stand-alone emotional harm is a matter of law for the
court.”48 The role of the judge in emotional harm cases is, in part,
to determine whether a particular category of relationships, for
example, manufacturer of a drug and purchaser of that drug, is
sufficient to support a claim for emotional harm. To avoid empty
suit litigation, however, courts should do more than determine
the “categories” where claims for negligent infliction of emotional
harm should be allowed. Judges should also recognize that
foreseeability alone should not be a predicate for emotional harm
claims. As the Supreme Court of California wisely recognized in
Thing v. La Chusa, “there are clear judicial days on which a court
can foresee forever and thus determine liability but none on
which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially
acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury.”49 The
Restatement Third echoes that caution in recognizing that
“foreseeability cannot appropriately be employed as the standard to
limit liability for emotional harm.”50
As tort law marches to the future, the talisman of
“foreseeability” is likely to be pressed by plaintiffs’ lawyers who
understandably wish to expand this tort. The “foreseeability” basis
for emotional harm cases, however, is a paradigm of empty suit
litigation. While such claims might be rejected by juries, with
foreseeability as a standard, plaintiff’s counsel can press for
settlement in cases that never should be allowed to go to a jury.

48
49
50

Id. § 47 cmt. g.
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47 cmt. i.
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MEDICAL MONITORING AND INCREASED RISK OF HARM
CLAIMS

Perhaps the most judicially analyzed examples of empty
suit litigation are claims for medical monitoring. In medical
monitoring claims, the plaintiff is not in any way ill, but might
become sick in the future. The essence of a medical monitoring
claim seeks future medical costs that might arise in an effort to
detect the disease. If the disease does indeed arise, then the
plaintiff can bring a separate claim for the costs of treating the
actual injury, pain and suffering, and other available damages.
Since many people are exposed to small amounts of potentially
harmful substances in their water, air, soil, homes, and workplaces
on a daily basis, open-ended liability for the cost of physician visits
and medical tests to monitor for signs of development of a
disease or condition can lead to massive class actions on behalf
of people who are unharmed and may never experience an injury.51
For this reason, most courts have rejected medical monitoring
claims or imposed exacting safeguards on such actions.
A.

Early Medical Monitoring Rulings

In the 1980s and 1990s, a handful of state appellate courts
permitted lawsuits seeking medical monitoring without a present
physical injury.52 While these court decisions allowed such claims,
most did so based on strict criteria and through court-supervised
funds that directly reimbursed verified medical testing costs.
1. Establishment of Court-Supervised Funds
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a landmark
opinion in 1987 when it became the first state high court to
recognize the viability of a request by uninjured plaintiffs for
the costs of medical monitoring.53 In that case, 339 people sued
51 See Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving
Plaintiffs or Tort Law’s Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
521 (2000).
52 See Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987);
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823-24 (Cal. 1993); Petito v. A.H.
Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus.,
97-3188, (La. 7/8/98); 716 So. 2d 355, 360-61 (superseded by statute, LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315
(2001)); Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311-12 (N.J. 1987); Redland Soccer Club,
Inc. v. U.S. Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Pa. 1997); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
53 Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), is often cited as the first case to adopt medical monitoring. In that instance,
the D.C. Circuit upheld a district court order, applying District of Columbia law,
requiring an aircraft maker to establish a $450,000 fund to pay for the reasonable
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their township, claiming that its operation of a nearby landfill
had allowed toxic waste to contaminate their water.54 Although
these individuals had not developed an injury, they sought
costs for annual doctors’ visits to monitor for cancer and other
diseases. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $8.2 million for future
medical surveillance, averaging about $500 per year of life
expectancy.55 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the
viability of a medical monitoring claim and allowed the lumpsum award, but it announced new principles for prospective
application in medical monitoring claims.56 The high court
found that the judiciary’s equitable powers permit such relief,
articulating a test that considers “the significance and extent of
exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the
seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at risk,
the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those
exposed, and the value of early diagnosis.”57
In establishing what it viewed as a “new rule” for the
58
future, however, the court found the use of lump sum awards
inadvisable for several reasons. It recognized that use of courtsupervised funds “provide a more efficient mechanism for
compensating plaintiffs” and “offers significant advantages”
over a lump-sum verdict.59 It also found that there are public
interests present in mass exposure cases that are not present
in conventional tort litigation. Use of a court-supervised fund
encourages plaintiffs to visit their doctor and not spend the
diagnostic examination expenses of forty Vietnamese orphans who survived a plane crash
during “Operation Babylift.” See id. at 819-20. While the court examined “whether tort
law should encompass a cause of action for diagnostic examinations without proof of
actual injury,” there is an important distinction between Friends for All Children and
pure no-injury cases seeking medical monitoring. Id. at 825. In Friends for All Children,
the plaintiffs sought medical monitoring due to the risk of brain damage stemming from
the rapid decompression of the plane. See id. Unlike the situation in modern medical
monitoring cases in which a plaintiff with no present physical injury seeks recovery for
exposure to a harmful substance, the orphans had suffered an objective, verifiable
physical injury in an airplane crash. See id. Similar to a situation in which a motorcycle
rider hits his head in an accident, it does not violate traditional principles of tort law to
require a reimbursement of the costs of tests that are reasonably necessary to evaluate
the potential harm. See id. The presence of an objective, physical impact reduces the
potential for fraudulent or speculative claims.
54 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 291.
55 See id. at 313 n.13.
56 See id. at 315 (declining to upset the jury’s lump sum award for medical
monitoring because the parties had tried the case conventionally, the defendant had
not proposed use of a court-supervised fund until its appeal, and because the fund
mechanism represented a novel approach).
57 Id. at 312.
58 Id. at 315.
59 Id. at 313-14. The New Jersey Supreme Court limited Ayers in Theer v.
Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993), which required medical monitoring
plaintiffs to prove injury resulting from direct exposure to a toxic substance.
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money for other purposes, limits a defendant’s liability to
amounts expended for that purpose, offsets liability to reflect
collateral sources such as coverage of such tests by health
insurance, prevents harm to public entities, and avoids the
judiciary recognizing a novel cause of action.60
Several courts followed the reasoning of the New Jersey
decision by allowing uninjured individuals to seek reimbursement
for actual medical monitoring expenses through a courtsupervised fund.61 For example, in 1997, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognized a claim for medical monitoring in a
case involving workers who excavated a former Army depot for
use as a soccer field, residents who lived nearby and relatives
who regularly visited them, and adults and children who
played soccer on the field. The court found that a plaintiff may
proceed with a common law claim seeking establishment of a
medical monitoring trust fund if he or she can show, through
presentation of expert testimony:
(1) exposure greater than normal background levels;
(2) to a proven hazardous substance;
(3) caused by the defendant’s negligence;
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, the plaintiff has a
significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease;
(5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of
the disease possible;
(6) the prescribed monitoring regime is different from that normally
recommended in the absence of exposure; and
(7) the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary according
to contemporary scientific principles.62

This test largely followed the Third Circuit’s prediction of how
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the existence of
a medical monitoring claim in a case involving residents who
claimed PCB exposure by people who worked or lived near a

60 See id. at 314-15. Evidence suggests that some of the Ayers plaintiffs used
their awards for personal expenses, such as buying a home, and did not see their
doctors any more frequently. See George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-veillance: A
History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 257 n.158 (1993).
61 See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987) (citing Ayers with approval in establishing a court-supervised medical monitoring
program for residents of land adjacent to asbestos-producing mill).
62 Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Pa. 1997).
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railyard as well as an earlier Utah Supreme Court decision,63
with one key difference. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
omitted a requirement that a plaintiff show that a treatment
exists for the disease that is the subject of medical monitoring.64
The Pennsylvania high court found that such a requirement
“would unfairly prevent a plaintiff from taking advantage of
advances in medical science.”65
In 1999, a Florida appellate court adopted the Pennsylvania
test, allowing a medical monitoring claim against the maker of
the weight loss drug combination known as Fen-Phen.66 After
the plaintiffs made the required threshold showing, the trial
court was required to take certain steps, involving significant
hands-on management, to protect the integrity of the fund.67 The
trial court would appoint an administrator to manage the plan
and assist the court in selecting advisory panel members,
establishing procedures, and selecting a neutral group of
examining physicians to perform the tests; establish notification
procedures for individuals who may be eligible for monitoring;
set a time frame for those eligible to obtain tests; and establish
reporting requirements for physician findings and charges.68 As
the appellate court cautioned, “The trial judge must act in a
businesslike manner, as concerns of time and money are the
essence of this program because private industry should not be
compelled to interminably defray the cost. The monitoring
contemplated is not a social justice program.”69
2. Cash Awards for Medical Monitoring
Although most of the early decisions permitting medical
monitoring claims adopted a system where courts manage
funds that would reimburse a plaintiff’s examination costs, two
state supreme courts went in a different direction in the late
1990s: Louisiana and West Virginia. The Louisiana decision

63 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 788 (3d Cir. 1994)
(supplementing the Paoli I criteria); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli I), 916 F.2d
829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990) (predicting that Pennsylvania would recognize a claim for
medical monitoring in the absence of injury and providing what was then the most
comprehensive articulation of requisite elements for a medical-monitoring claim);
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993).
64 Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 146 n.8.
65 Id.
66 Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 145-46).
67 Id. at 107.
68 See id.
69 Id.
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was overturned by the state’s legislature, leaving West Virginia
as the sole outlier.
Louisiana briefly allowed medical monitoring recovery
absent physical injury following a 1998 ruling of its high court
in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc.70 In Bourgeois,
asymptomatic individuals who were exposed to asbestos sought
compensation for the cost of regular medical examinations to
detect the onset of potential latent diseases.71 The Louisiana
Supreme Court acknowledged that traditional tort law only
permitted an award for medical expenses when there is a
corresponding physical injury, a rule intended to avoid “an
atmosphere of unlimited and unpredictable liability.”72 While
not recognizing a new cause of action for medical monitoring,
the court found that plaintiffs may recover medical monitoring
costs as an element of damages when a defendant is liable
under a traditional tort claim, such as negligence or strict
liability.73 The Louisiana high court did not decide whether
such damages are available through a court-administered fund
or as a lump-sum.74 Nevertheless, its decision sparked a surge
of litigation,75 leading the state’s legislature to preclude
damages for future medical services or surveillance
“unless . . . directly related to a manifest physical or mental
injury or disease.”76
It was West Virginia that boldly broke new ground in
1999, when the state’s highest court recognized an independent
cause of action for medical monitoring in which plaintiffs with
no present physical injury could recover unrestricted damages.77
The case involved individuals who claimed they were exposed to
thirty toxic substances as a result of the defendant companies
maintaining a pile of debris from making light bulbs.78 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted a test that is
expansive in both eligibility and available recovery. While its test is
similar to that used by courts such as those in Pennsylvania,79 the
court found that a medical monitoring claim is viable even when
Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 716 So. 2d 355, 361-62 (La. 1998).
See id. at 357.
72 Id. at 358.
73 See id. at 361.
74 See id. at 362 n.16.
75 See Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, Medical Monitoring in Missouri
After Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.: Sound Policy Should Be Restored to a Vague and
Unsound Directive, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 135, 154 n.139 (2007) (citing cases).
76 See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(B) (2001) (applicable to all causes of action
accruing on or after July 9, 1999).
77 Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999).
78 Id. at 426-27.
79 See id. at 432-33.
70
71
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the amount of the exposure to a toxic substance is not a level
sufficient to cause injury and there is no effective treatment for the
disease.80 “All that must be demonstrated,” the court found, “is that
the plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of contracting a
particular disease relative to what would be the case in the absence
of exposure.”81 The court allowed for medical monitoring based on
“subjective desires of a plaintiff for information concerning the
state of his or her health.”82 Unlike other states that require
plaintiffs to apply for reimbursement of actual medical expenses
through a court-administered fund, the West Virginia high court
permitted an award of damages as a lump sum.83
As a result of this decision, plaintiffs who assert medical
monitoring claims in West Virginia can recover cash awards,
even when medical monitoring is not medically necessary or
beneficial, and can spend the money as they choose. The ruling
has been harshly criticized.84 As the late Justice Elliot Maynard
cautioned in dissent, the “practical effect of this decision is to
make almost every West Virginian a potential plaintiff in a
medical monitoring cause of action.”85 Anyone who comes in
contact with hazardous substances “may be able to collect money
as victorious plaintiffs without any showing of injury at all.”86
The ruling has fueled litigation in the state.87 For example,
in 2011, DuPont settled a class action lawsuit brought by
residents who lived near a zinc smelter that it had closed after
operating for 27 years. The $70 million settlement included $4
million in payments to eligible residents for medical monitoring.
While 6,700 people filed the paperwork to receive a $400
payment for completing the forms, only about half that number
actually obtained medical monitoring through the program.88

See id. at 433-34.
Id. at 433.
82 Id.
83 Id.; see also In re West Virginia Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 71 (W. Va.
2003) (reversing trial court’s denial of certification of medical monitoring class action).
84 See generally Victor E. Schwartz, Sherman Joyce & Cary Silverman, West
Virginia as a Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in State Courts, 111 W.
VA. L. REV. 757, 775-78 (2009) (examining how Bower has contributed to West Virginia’s
poor reputation for evenhanded civil justice); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk,
Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 845 (2002) (criticizing
Bower’s criteria as imposing “potentially crushing liabilities”).
85 Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 435 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
86 Id.
87 See Behrens & Appel, supra note 75, at 152 n.125 (citing medical monitoring
litigation brought by coal plant workers, smokers, users of prescription drugs, and others).
88 See Who Would Turn Down a Quick $400?, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Sept.
14, 2011), http://www.charlestondailymail.com/Opinion/Editorials/201109135102.
80

81
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As one local newspaper editorialized, “They are taking their
$400 and running.”89
B.

Supreme Court Rejection of Medical Monitoring Claims
under Federal Law

Some judges have found that characterizing these early
decisions as a “trend” favoring medical monitoring claims
would be “somewhat overstated.”90 States quickly reversed
course and reached a consensus view disfavoring such claims
after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected medical monitoring
recovery under a federal law governing compensation for
railroad employee injuries in 1997.91
In Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, the Supreme
Court held that under the Federal Employers Liability Act, a
pipefitter who was exposed to asbestos in the workplace but
had no present physical symptoms could not bring “a new, fullblown, tort law cause of action” for medical monitoring to
detect any future signs of an asbestos-related disease.92 The
Court recognized that modern life involves incidental exposure to
so many toxic substances that “tens of millions of individuals”
might qualify for “some form of substance-exposure-related
medical monitoring.”93 Coupled with “uncertainty as to the
amount of liability” for medical monitoring, courts could face
“both a ‘flood’ of less important cases (potentially absorbing
resources better left available to those more seriously harmed)
and the systemic harms that can accompany ‘unlimited and
unpredictable liability’ (for example, vast testing liability
adversely affecting the allocation of scarce medical resources).”94
In reaching its decision, the Court “canvassed the statelaw cases that have considered whether the negligent causation
of [mere exposure to a toxic substance] . . . by itself constitutes a
sufficient basis for tort recovery,” and found that such a theory
was “beyond the bounds of currently evolving common law.”95
The Court was “troubled . . . by the potential systemic effects of
creating a new . . . cause of action,” noting “the effects upon
interests of other potential plaintiffs who are not before the
court and who depend on a tort system that can distinguish
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 439 (Nev. 2001).
Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 444 (1997).
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 442.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 440 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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between reliable and serious claims on the one hand, and
unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.”96 The
Court concluded that the “competing interests . . . at stake”
weighed against creating a new cause of action for medical
monitoring—especially because “those interests sometimes can
be reconciled in ways other than simply through the creation of
a full blown, traditional, tort law cause of action.”97
C.

Following Buckley, Most State Courts Rejected Medical
Monitoring Claims

After Buckley, a flurry of state supreme courts followed
the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in rapid succession,
including the high courts of Nevada (2001),98 Alabama (2001),99
Kentucky (2002),100 Michigan (2005),101 Mississippi (2007),102
and Oregon (2008).103 These claims were brought on behalf of
plaintiffs who claimed exposure to toxins in the environment,104
products containing hazardous chemicals,105 prescription drugs
with potential side effects,106 and cigarette smoke.107 In each of
these contexts, courts described a common law cause of action
for medical monitoring as “a novel, non-traditional tort and
remedy.”108 They recognized that allowing a medical monitoring
claim based on mere exposure would flout “well-established
negligence requirements”109 and constitute “an unprecedented
and unfounded departure from the long-standing traditional
elements of a tort action.”110
These courts understood that the requirement that a
plaintiff must experience a physical injury before bringing a tort
claim is essential to objectively distinguishing between which
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
98 Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001).
99 Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
100 Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002).
101 Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005).
102 Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007), aff’d,
483 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007).
103 Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181 (Or. 2008).
104 Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 828; Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 685-86.
105 Paz, 949 So. 2d at 2.
106 Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 849 (Ky. 2002).
107 Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438 (Nev. 2001); Lowe, 183 P.3d at 182;
see also June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming
dismissal of medical monitoring claims asserted by residents of former uranium and vanadium
mining town under the Price Anderson Act of 1957 due to their lack of bodily injury).
108 Badillo, 16 P.3d at 438.
109 Lowe, 183 P.3d at 187.
110 Paz, 949 So. 2d at 6; see also Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 856 (describing a medical
monitoring claim as “uncharted territory” beyond “well-settled principles of tort law”).
96

97
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plaintiffs have stated a valid claim and which plaintiffs have
not.111 Abandoning this rule, as the Kentucky Supreme Court
emphasized, “would force us to stretch the limits of logic and
ignore a long line of legal precedent.”112 The Alabama Supreme
Court went so far as to describe medical monitoring claims on
behalf of individuals with no present physical injury or illness as
“stand[ing] Alabama tort law on its head in an attempt to
alleviate . . . concerns about what might occur in the future.”113 It
concluded that “[t]o recognize medical monitoring as a distinct
cause of action . . . would require this Court to completely
rewrite Alabama’s tort-law system, a task akin to traveling in
uncharted waters, without the benefit of a seasoned guide.”114
These courts also expressed concern that if the law
permits uninjured individuals to recover damages for medical
monitoring, those who are sick or may become sick in the future
could be adversely affected because limited resources are
diverted to those who are not sick and may never develop a
disease as a result of their alleged exposure. As the Michigan
Supreme Court noted, “a potentially limitless pool of plaintiffs”
with “preinjury claims could drain resources needed to
compensate those with manifest physical injuries and a more
immediate need for medical care.”115 Similarly, the Kentucky
Supreme Court observed that “[s]pending large amounts of
money to satisfy medical monitoring judgments will impair
[defendants’] ability to fully compensate victims who emerge
years later with actual injuries that require immediate
attention.”116 In such circumstances, imposing liability for
medical monitoring in absence of a present injury would, as the
Alabama high court found, subject defendants to enormous
costs with little or no public benefit.117
D.

Recent Consideration of Medical Monitoring Claims

Over the past seven years, the pendulum briefly swung
back toward permitting medical monitoring claims with broad
rulings in Missouri and Nevada, a fact-specific outcome in
111 Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 689-91 (Mich. 2005) (noting that
the physical injury requirement “serves a number of important ends” such as reducing
the risks of fraudulent claims and providing courts with a clear standard to determine
whether plaintiffs have stated a valid claim).
112 Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 854.
113 Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831 (Ala. 2001).
114 Id. at 830.
115 Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 694.
116 Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 857.
117 See Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 830 (finding that “a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis counsels
against recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring”).
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Massachusetts, and a narrow decision in Maryland. Most
recently, however, New York’s highest court adhered to the
traditional rule that the law does not recognize medical
monitoring claims in absence of a present physical injury.
The Missouri Supreme Court began this swing in 2007,
when it broadly permitted a class action seeking cash for
medical monitoring on behalf of children allegedly exposed to
lead released into the environment by the defendant’s
smelter.118 The court embraced a radical concept: it found that
“widely recognized tort law concepts premised on physical injury
are ill-equipped to deal with cases involving latent injury.”119 The
court found that once a plaintiff shows “a significantly increased
risk of contracting a particular disease relative to what would be
the case in absence of exposure,”120 a plaintiff may recover for
medical monitoring as an element of damages in a traditional
tort claim.121 The court allowed such recovery without present
physical injury and regardless of the intensity of duration of
the plaintiffs’ exposure.122
In reaching its conclusion that “tort law has evolved
over the years to allow plaintiffs compensation for medical
monitoring,”123 the court relied on pre-Buckley rulings, while
failing to acknowledge the substantial body of precedent in
more recent years rejecting medical monitoring claims absent a
present physical injury and the policy reasons cautioning
against such an approach.124
Massachusetts’s highest court followed in 2009 in
Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., when it narrowly found that
chronic smokers who had not developed any smoking-related
illness, but could show damage to their lungs that may indicate a
significantly heightened risk of developing cancer, could recover
through a medical monitoring claim.125 In that case, the court

See Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Mo. 2007).
Id. at 716.
120 Id. at 718 (quoting Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 433
(W. Va. 1999)).
121 See id. at 717-18.
122 See id. at 719.
123 Id. at 716.
124 See Behrens & Appel, supra note 75, at 154-60 (exposing the flaws in the
Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning and suggesting steps Missouri courts could take to
“restore reasonableness” to the availability of medical monitoring claims in Missouri).
Federal courts have declined to extend Meyer to claims for medical monitoring on behalf of
uninjured people against manufacturers of allegedly defective products, finding that the
Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning applies only to potential latent injuries resulting from
exposure to toxic substances. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Mentor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929
(W.D. Mo. 2008).
125 Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 901-02 (Mass. 2009).
118

119
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permitted medical monitoring when the plaintiff establishes,
through competent expert testimony, that:
(1) The defendant’s negligence (2) caused (3) the plaintiff to become
exposed to a hazardous substance that produced, at least,
subcellular changes that substantially increased the risk of serious
disease, illness, or injury (4) for which an effective medical test for
reliable early detection exists, (5) and early detection, combined with
prompt and effective treatment, will significantly decrease the risk
of death or the severity of the disease, illness or injury, and (6) such
diagnostic medical examinations are reasonably (and periodically)
necessary, conformably with the standard of care, and (7) the
present value of the reasonable cost of such tests and care, as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.126

Rather than money damages, the plaintiffs sought to compel
cigarette makers to provide them with a court-supervised
program of medical surveillance using a specific technology,
low-dose computed tomography chest scans, for early detection
of lung cancer.127
The court’s requirement that the plaintiff show “proof of
impact” and physiological changes128 provides at least a marginal
limiting factor in medical monitoring cases and distinguishes
Donovan from decisions that allowed claims to proceed without
any evidence of physical injuries on the basis of exposure to
hazardous substances. The court broadly found that when there is
such a marker, “[n]o particular level or quantification of increase
in risk of harm is necessary, so long as it is substantial.”129
The Massachusetts high court gave few justifications for
its sweeping holding. Donovan did not cite the many decisions
rejecting medical monitoring, let alone grapple with their
reasoning. The court downplayed its significant departure from
tort law in allowing recovery for medical monitoring for the
increased risk of serious disease, comparing it to allowing
recovery for the costs of medical testing after an accident that
produces physical trauma but no visible injuries.130 As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Buckley, however, physical
trauma cases represent “special recovery” situations that are
“beside the point” in typical medical monitoring cases that do
not involve the “presence of a traumatic physical impact.”131 In
physical trauma cases, plaintiffs have suffered a cognizable
injury: they have been physically struck, and the only question
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 902.
See id. at 897-98.
Id. at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 901.
Donovan, 914 N.E.2d at 900-01.
Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 440 (1997).
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is how badly they were hurt. Medical testing confirms the
extent of the injury that the plaintiffs actually suffered at the
time of the accident.132
The court’s analysis suggests that it will consider the
viability of medical monitoring claims on an individual, factspecific basis. Donovan involved an instance in which individuals
alleged “a present injury in the form of objectively observable and
identifiable damage to the tissues and structures of their lungs
resulting in a substantially increased risk of cancer.”133 The
court’s ruling may have limited applicability beyond the context of
tobacco litigation.134
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in what
may be the first appellate decision addressing a medical
monitoring claim under Massachusetts law post-Donovan, found
that former Raytheon plant workers who claimed exposure to
beryllium dust and fumes, and their family members, who
claimed exposure to particles the workers brought home on their
clothing, failed to state a medical monitoring claim.135 The court
granted summary judgment to the company because the
plaintiffs presented no evidence that they had developed
beryllium sensitization, a condition that may show an increased
risk for organ problems.136 The court also found that Donovan
unambiguously required a showing of symptoms or subclinical
changes to support a medical monitoring claim and described
the plaintiffs’ attempt to read the case differently as through
“rose-colored glasses.”137
The Maryland Court of Appeals is the most recent high
court to permit a claim for medical monitoring; however, it
provided significant safeguards intended to prevent wholly
speculative lawsuits.138 In a case involving an underground
gasoline leak, the court found that residents whose wells did
not test above government action levels for MTBE could not
show an “objective, reasonable fear of developing cancer” or
maintain a claim for medical monitoring.139 It rejected the
132 See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d
816, 819-20 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
133 Donovan, 914 N.E.2d at 898.
134 The court explicitly noted that it would “leave for another day consideration of
cases that involve exposure to levels of chemicals or radiation known to cause cancer, for which
immediate medical monitoring may be necessary although no symptoms or subclinical changes
have occurred.” Id. at 901.
135 See Genereux v. Raytheon, 754 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2014).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 71 A.3d 105 (Md. 2013); Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30 (Md. 2013).
139 Albright, 71 A.3d at 67, 85.
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plaintiffs’ lawyers’ contention that “any exposure” to the
chemical was sufficient to bring a lawsuit.140 Each individual,
through expert testimony, would need to show “a particularized,
significantly-increased risk of developing a disease in comparison
to the general public” to recover proven medical costs.141 The court
also found that instead of giving plaintiffs cash awards that could
be spent on items other than healthcare expenses, the appropriate
relief is to establish a fund, administered by a trustee, to reimburse
valid medical monitoring expenses.142 Finally, the court upheld the
general rule that individuals cannot recover damages merely for
fear of developing a disease in the future unless that fear is
reasonable and he or she, as a result of that fear, developed a
physical injury capable of objective determination.143 Finding that
the trial courts had not applied these requirements, the Maryland
Court of Appeals reversed a $1.5 billion compensatory and
punitive damages award and a $147 million award in the
companion cases.
In December 2013, the New York Court of Appeals, the
state’s highest court, rejected an equitable medical monitoring
claim brought by longtime heavy smokers who have not been
diagnosed with a smoking-related disease.144 The court found
that medical monitoring is only available after an individual
shows a physical injury. The court explained that “[t]he
requirement that a plaintiff sustain physical harm before being
able to recover in tort is a fundamental principle of our state’s
tort system.”145 This physical injury requirement is important,
the court found, because “it defines the class of persons who
actually possess a cause of action, provides a basis for the
factfinder to determine whether a litigant actually possesses a
claim, and protects court dockets from being clogged with
frivolous and unfounded claims.”146
The court recognized that although it “undoubtedly has the
authority to recognize a new tort cause of action, . . . [this]
authority must be exercised responsibly.”147 The court summarized
some of the policy problems that could occur from creating a
new, full-blown tort cause of action. For instance, the court
acknowledged that countless plaintiffs could come forward to
recover monitoring costs, “effectively flooding the courts while
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

See id. at 44, 67 n.60, 85.
Id. at 84.
See id. at 80-81.
Id. at 67; Ford, 71 A.3d at 127-30.
See generally Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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concomitantly depleting the tortfeasor’s resources for those who
have actually sustained damage.”148 “Moreover,” the court added,
“it is speculative at best, whether asymptomatic plaintiffs will
ever contract a disease; allowing them to recover medical
monitoring costs without first establishing physical injury would
lead to the inequitable diversion of money away from those who
have actually sustained an injury as a result of the exposure.”149
The court also noted that, from a practical standpoint, “it cannot
be overlooked that there is no framework concerning how such a
medical monitoring program would be implemented and
administered.”150 The court concluded, “The legislature is
plainly in the better position to study the impact and
consequences of creating such a cause of action, including the
costs of implementation and the burden on the courts in
adjudicating such claims.”151
The pendulum continues to swing. In a New Year’s Eve
2014 decision, the Nevada Supreme Court, revisited its earlier
decision in Badillo in which it was among the first to follow
Buckley.152 The court ruled that while Nevada does not recognize
a stand-alone claim for medical monitoring, a plaintiff may seek
medical monitoring as a form of relief to an ordinary negligence
suit even when he or she does not have a present physical
injury.153 So long as a plaintiff can plead and prove negligence,
he or she can recover medical monitoring damages.154 The court
expressly declined, at the time, to provide criteria for a plaintiff
to qualify for such relief.155 Rather, it is sufficient, the court
said, for the plaintiff to show that he or she is “reasonably
required to undergo medical monitoring beyond what would
have been recommended had the plaintiff not been exposed to
the negligent act of the defendant.”156
E.

Proper Treatment of Medical Monitoring Claims

As these cases show, it is critical for courts to exercise
prudence when considering lawsuits seeking compensation for
medical monitoring. Courts may take the unsound, minority
Id. at 18.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. (citing Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and
the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 382-85 (2005) [hereinafter Medical Monitoring]).
152 Sadler v. PacifiCare of Nev., 340 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Nev. 2014).
153 Id. at 1270.
154 Id. at 1271.
155 Id. at 1271-72.
156 Id. at 1272.
148
149
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approach, illustrated by Missouri and West Virginia, which
permits large class actions seeking cash damages now based on
a speculative future harm. Or they can take the Maryland
approach, which permits medical monitoring in a narrow range
of cases, requires individual proof of harm, and reimburses
actual medical expenses from a fund. Even courts that might
permit judicially-supervised medical monitoring have rejected
such claims when they involve remote risks.157 The most
defensible approach is to follow the steps of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the New York Court of Appeals, and most other state
courts in upholding traditional principles of law by rejecting
medical monitoring claims by individuals with no present injury.
If courts recognize a broad cause of action for medical
monitoring, the prospect of endless liability is easy to envision.
Untold numbers of plaintiffs could seek recovery for their
exposure to allegedly defective pharmaceutical products,
environmental toxins, or workplace chemicals. Lawsuits may be
rooted in fear and unsupported by most scientific studies, but
rely on outlier, preliminary, or arguably inapplicable studies.
Each scare could trigger a wave of speculative lawsuits. Cell
phone manufacturers may face suits from users who believe that
they need monitoring to detect the possible risk of cancer from
minute amounts of radiation.158 People who regularly use plastic
containers in microwaves or drink from water bottles containing
BPA may sue manufacturers to detect whether there are
harmful effects.159 Millions of people who use nonstick cooking
pans might have sued for medical monitoring costs.160 Diet soda
manufacturers risk lawsuits complaining that sugar substitutes
carry cancer risks and demanding medical monitoring to ensure
early detection.161 Women who use baby powder may demand
157 See, e.g., Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 614 F. Supp. 2d 536, 537 (E.D. Pa.
2008); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 826 (N.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d sub
nom. Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006); Pohl v. NGK
Metals Corp., No. 0733, 2006 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 472, at *45-49 (Pa. C.P. Nov. 29,
2006); see also Rowe v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Civil Nos. 06-1810 (RMB), 06-3080,
2008 WL 5412912, at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2008) (denying class certification).
158 See, e.g., Geoffrey Kabat, Do Cell Phones Cause Brain Cancer? The Diehards
Cling Desperately to Opinion, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/geoffreykabat/2013/03/05/do-cell-phones-cause-brain-cancer-the-diehards-clingdesperately-to-opinion/.
159 See, e.g., Amanda Mascarelli, BPA is Still Everywhere, and Mounting Evidence
Suggests Harmful Effects, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/bpa-is-still-everywhere-and-mounting-evidence-suggests-harmfuleffects/2013/12/06/2ff4a462-5b5d-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story.html.
160 See, e.g., Robert L. Wolke, Don’t Toss That Teflon Pan-Yet, WASH. POST
(Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/31/
AR2006013100279.html.
161 See, e.g., Assoc. Press, Diet Coke Under Pressure to Reverse Slump, Exec
Says, LAS VEGAS SUN (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/oct/15/
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medical monitoring for an increased risk of ovarian cancer.162 If
the potential plaintiffs are innumerable, then so too are the
number of companies that might suddenly face massive,
unforeseen liability for long-term screening.
In addition, those who believe they were exposed to toxic
substances do not necessarily benefit from such litigation. Some
plaintiffs would likely suffer anxiety as a result of “[f]alse
positives [that] can devastate patients and their families.”163 One
study found that “the probability of overdiagnosis is remarkably
high” in screening and early detection programs (i.e., “some of
the cases diagnosed by an early detection program would have
never developed the disease”).164 Furthermore, medical screening
itself may pose health risks that may be greater than the risks
for which monitoring is sought.165 As the New York Court of
Appeals recognized, imposing liability before a person develops a
condition may deplete resources available for individuals should
they develop a medical condition in the future.166
The imposition of medical monitoring liability is
unpredictable because our understanding of when exposure to a
particular substance may trigger disease is continually
evolving.167 As some of the examples above illustrate, prospective
plaintiffs’ claims may exist one moment and disappear the next
as emerging science redefines if and when individuals are at risk
of disease, and whether there is any health benefit to early
diet-coke-under-pressure-reverse-slump-exec-says/. Animal studies in the 1970s led to
widespread concern that saccharin could cause cancer, but subsequent studies showed
no clear evidence of an association between saccharin and cancer in humans. A federal
law required elimination of the warning label requirement in 2000. See Artificial
Sweeteners and Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/
factsheet/Risk/artificial-sweeteners (last visited May 1, 2015).
162 See Sindhu Sundar, J&J Seeks To Boot Suit Claiming Baby Powder Causes
Cancer, LAW360 (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/566440/print?section=
classification (discussing class actions seeking economic losses in Mihalich v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 3:14-cv-00600 (S.D. Ill.) (complaint filed May 23, 2014) and Estrada v. Johnson
& Johnson, No. 2:14-cv-01051 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint filed Apr. 18, 2014)).
163 Medical Monitoring, supra note 151, at 356-57; Serena Gordon, More
Cancer Tests Mean More False-Positive Results, ABC NEWS (May 11, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Healthday/story?id=7562464.
164 Ori Davidov & Marvin Zelen, Overdiagnosis in Early Detection Programs, 5
BIOSTATISTICS 603, 603 (2004).
165 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, In Push for Cancer Screening, Limited Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/health/17screening.html?
_r=0&pagewanted=print (“[E]xcept for a few types of cancer, routine screening has not been
proven to reduce the death toll from cancer for people without specific symptoms or risk
factors—like a breast lump or a family history of cancer—and could even lead to harm,
many experts on health say.”); Shirley S. Wang, CT Scans Linked to Cancer, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 15, 2009), www.wsj.com/articles/SB126082398582691047.
166 See Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11, 18 (N.Y. 2013).
167 See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the RiskInjury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1709-11 (2007).
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detection. Companies would never be able to predict how many
plaintiffs had potential claims or for which plaintiffs screening
would be medically advisable.
In addition, the policy rationales supporting medical
monitoring have lost much of their force. Now that insurers must
provide insurance regardless of any preexisting condition, and all
people are required to have insurance coverage or face a penalty,
the notion that individuals may lack access to basic screening for
cancer or other illnesses is even more questionable.
In sum, medical monitoring claims, while having a surface
appeal, are empty suit litigation. The scales of justice
overwhelmingly weigh against creating a cause of action for
totally asymptomatic plaintiffs. If courts recognize a medical
monitoring cause of action, then the elements of a medical
monitoring cause of action should be narrowly tailored with
precise criteria that mitigate open-ended and unpredictable
liability. The further problem with such a tailored approach is
that most courts are not equipped to “monitor” medical
monitoring claims far into the future.
III.

UNMANIFESTED PRODUCT DEFECTS

Anyone who watches television or listens to the radio is
familiar with this common voiceover, often in regard to a drug or
medical device: “If you have used [product] and suffered an injury,
such as [medical condition], you may be entitled to compensation.”
In recent years, plaintiffs’ lawyers have flipped this pitch on its
head. With growing frequency, attorneys are filing class actions
(no advertisement to identify clients is necessary) on behalf of
everyone who purchased an allegedly defective product who was
not harmed. These claims are a paradigm of empty suit litigation.
Plaintiffs and defendants are not likely to see eye-to-eye
on whether class members in such claims experienced harm.
The claims sound much like product liability suits but are often
brought under other theories of liability. Rather than claim a
product caused physical harm, the lawsuits often seek to recover
for alleged pecuniary losses stemming from a latent, unmanifested
defect. These nebulous claims for “economic loss” typically rely on
expert testimony to present a theory of classwide damages. Some
claims seek compensation for the difference between the value of
the product free from defects and the resale value of the product
after it is tarnished by allegations of a defect. Alternatively, these
claims may essentially allege that consumers overpaid for the
product and seek the difference between the purchase price and
the hypothetical lower market value of the product resulting
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from an allegedly undisclosed risk that was not experienced by
the plaintiffs.
As Professor Sheila Scheuerman observes, in recent
years, plaintiffs have shifted their theories of recovery in these
types of suits from tort and contract claims, which have shown
little success, to violations of state consumer protection acts.168
As this section will show, some courts have demonstrated a
willingness to entertain lawsuits that claim a product’s value
has diminished because of concerns that the product might fail
in the future, while most others have rejected such claims.
The result is that any person who suffered a physical
injury allegedly as a result of a defect brings a personal injury
claim, which is often consolidated in a mass tort docket, while
everyone else who uneventfully purchased and used the product
becomes a member of a consumer class action for economic loss.
Overall, courts “have been singularly unreceptive to these ‘noinjury’ claims.”169 While most courts have dismissed claims or
denied class certification, some unmanifested defect claims have
resulted in multi-million and billion dollar settlements. This
section examines recent examples in two of the most common
products subject to these no-injury claims, prescription drugs and
automobiles, though similar types of cases arise in other
contexts.170 It also considers recent consumer class action
litigation that reached the U.S. Supreme Court related to alleged
defects in washing machines and the impact of the Court’s ruling
in Comcast v. Behrend on class certification of such theories.

168 See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Against Liability for Private Risk-Exposure, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 691 (2012).
169 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 273 & n.84 (2005).
170 See, e.g., Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 861 (11th Cir.
2012) (affirming district court’s denial of class certification where plaintiff sought
damages on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased a fantasy video game because
the class included users who never experienced the alleged defect, which occurred only
after 200 or more hours of play, and therefore never sustained a loss); Sanchez v. Wal
Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 2:06-CV-2573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal.
May 28, 2009) (denying class certification where class representative made use of an
umbrella stroller for eighteen months without incident yet sought partial refund of the
$20 retail price representing the product’s alleged diminution in value after it was
found to have a pinch point that posed a risk of harm because there was “no proof of the
existence of injury on a classwide basis”); Wilson v. Style Crest Prods., Inc., 627 S.E.2d
733, 736 (S.C. 2006) (recognizing, in dismissing warranty and fraudulent concealment
claims brought by purchasers of anchor tie down systems for manufactured homes
claimed to have a risk of failure in high winds, that “the no-injury approach to product
litigation has been rejected in most decisions”).
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Lawsuits on Behalf of Patients Who Used a Drug and
May Have Benefited From It

Mass tort litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers
typically alleges that an FDA-approved prescription drug failed to
adequately warn of particular risks and that a defect in the
information that accompanies the drug or its labeling caused a
patient to use the drug and suffer an adverse effect. At any
particular point in time, thousands of these types of
pharmaceutical product liability claims are pending in state and
federal courts, awaiting trial or settlement.171 Some plaintiffs’
lawyers, however, bring a different variety of lawsuit against drug
makers. Rather than allege that a defect in the drug caused
harm, these claims generally allege that a drug is simply not as
safe or effective as patients (or their doctors) were led to believe,
or that the patient would not have purchased the drug, or spent
less for it, had she fully appreciated the risks, even when the
medicine worked for that individual. The remedy sought is often a
refund of the purchase price or the estimated difference in value
of the drug as marketed and the drug sold with its alleged flaws.
Is this empty suit litigation? In answering this question,
one observes that several judges have dismissed these types of
claims by finding that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing or
fail to state a claim. For example, in a frequently cited Fifth
Circuit case, Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the court found
that an individual who purchased and used Duract, a painkiller
that was found to have a risk of causing liver damage, did not
show injury-in-fact when she, and those she sought to represent,
had experienced no physical injuries.172 The court essentially
characterized the claim as, “you sold it, I bought it, there was a
defect in the product’s design or warnings, other patients were
injured, pay me.”173 The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
never explained how the class members experienced economic
injury but spent “most of their brief listing helpful suggestions on

171 Over 20,000 pharmaceutical product liability claims are currently in federal
multi-district litigation. See U.S. J.P.M.L., MDL STATISTICS REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF
PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT (2014) [hereinafter MDL STATISTICS REPORT],
available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_
District-July-15-2014.pdf.
172 Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2002).
173 See id. at 319 (“Rivera’s claim to injury runs something like this: Wyeth sold
Duract; Rivera purchased and used Duract; Wyeth did not list enough warnings on
Duract, and/or Duract was defective; other patients were injured by Duract; Rivera would
like her money back. The plaintiffs do not claim Duract caused them physical or
emotional injury, was ineffective as a pain killer, or has any future health consequences
to users. Instead, they assert that their loss of cash is an ‘economic injury.’”).
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how a court could calculate damages.”174 In finding the class
members lacked standing, the Fifth Circuit found that the alleged
injuries were not experienced by the class, but were suffered by
non-class member patients.175
A federal district court came to a similar conclusion in
Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., which involved a class action
brought on behalf of patients who purchased OxyContin, a
medication for relief of chronic pain.176 The plaintiffs alleged that
the manufacturer over-promoted the drug as providing “‘smooth
and sustained’ pain relief for twelve hours” with little chance of
addiction, which allowed the manufacturer to artificially inflate
its prices.177 The plaintiffs specifically excluded from the class “all
patients who failed to receive 12-hour relief from OxyContin
and/or who had problems with its alleged addictive qualities.”178
The court was faced squarely with the question of “whether
patients who were prescribed a drug for pain, and who
personally suffered no ill effects or lack of efficacy, can sue for
money damages” under the District of Columbia’s consumer
protection law.179 After reaffirming that only consumers actually
harmed can recover through tort law, the court considered the
“more difficult question” of whether the District’s consumer
protection statute allowed such a claim.180 Relying on Rivera, the
court found that the plaintiffs did not allege that they “were in
any way deceived—or even saw—any of that advertising” and
failed to allege that they sustained any injury-in-fact.181 The court
dismissed the claim, reasoning that the plaintiffs had received the
benefit of the bargain—a drug that had relieved their pain—and
had no basis to recover the purchase cost.182
Id.
Id. at 320. After the manufacturer of the drug withdrew it from the market, the
FDA counseled those who used it that, upon discontinuing use of the drug, they should not be
concerned about developing liver problems as a result of the drug in the future and no action is
necessary. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Questions and Answers for Withdrawal of Duract, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm073043.htm.
176 Williams v. Purdue Pharm. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 172-73 (D.D.C. 2003).
177 See id.
178 Id. at 173.
179 Id. at 172.
180 Id. at 176-77.
181 Id. at 177 (finding Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315 (5th Cir.
2002), “both instructive and persuasive”).
182 See id. at 176. Another example is In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210
F.R.D. 61, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), where the court, in denying class certification to
unharmed users of an anti-diabetic and anti-inflammatory drug under the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, found that it was not a “defensible position” to presume that
Rezulin was worthless when it was undisputed that the drug was “enormously beneficial
to many patients” who “presumably got their money’s worth and suffered no economic
injury.” Id. But cf. In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 75 (W. Va. 2003) (reversing
174
175
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More recently, courts addressed the viability of product
defect claims without injury following Merck’s withdrawal of
Vioxx from the market after a clinical trial revealed that it could
increase the risk of heart attack and stroke. Merck faced
numerous individual claims and class actions in federal and state
court filed on behalf of the estimated 20 million patients who took
the drug between 1999 and 2004.183 In dismissing a Vioxx claim of
a District of Columbia resident for lack of Article III standing in
2012, the court overseeing federal multidistrict litigation found
that “[t]here is no obvious, quantifiable pecuniary loss that
Plaintiff incurred from purchasing a drug that worked for him
and did not cause him any harm.”184 The New Jersey Supreme
Court dismissed a Vioxx-related class action, finding that a
plaintiff who has not experienced “a personal physical injury”
cannot bring what is essentially a product liability claim through
asserting a medical monitoring or consumer protection claim.185
Courts reached similar results in Avandia litigation
where individuals not injured by the diabetes drug alleged that
their physicians might not have been adequately warned of all of
the risks associated with the drug and, had they been, might have
prescribed an alternative medication,186 or that the company overpromoted the drug’s safety and effectiveness.187 Courts have also
flatly rejected assertions that any person who purchased a drug
for an off-label use necessarily overpaid because the purchase
price was predicated on the drug having scientifically-

trial court denial of class certification of consumer protection claim, finding that “[i]f the
consumer proves that he or she has purchased an item that is different from or inferior to
that for which he bargained, the ‘ascertainable loss’ requirement [of the West Virginia
statute] is satisfied”).
183 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 874 F. Supp. 2d 599, 601 (E.D. La. 2012).
184 Id. at 606; see also Heindel v. Pfizer, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 364, 365, 386 (D.N.J.
2004) (granting summary judgment for defendant where individuals with arthritis who
took, and received pain relief from, Celebrex or Vioxx sought to recover some or all of the
purchase price by alleging that the defendants failed to publicize the results of two clinical
studies that revealed possible risks associated with the use of the drugs).
185 Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d 587, 595 (N.J. 2008).
186 See, e.g., Dumpson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civil Action No. 10-2476,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96776, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (finding plaintiff failed to
state claim under California consumer protection statute or for unjust enrichment where
“Plaintiff has not alleged any harm to him: he does not allege that his health was
impaired by the use of Avandia, nor does he identify what he would have paid for some
other drug had he not taken Avandia, or anything beyond that his physician ‘might have
considered prescribing’ some ‘alternative medication’”).
187 See, e.g., Schrank v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civil Action No. 07-4965,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96768, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (dismissing claims under
New York’s consumer protection statute and for medical monitoring where plaintiff failed
to allege she purchased Avandia as a result of misrepresentations in advertisements or
that she paid more for Avandia than an alternative treatment).
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demonstrated efficacy for its labeled indications only.188 Where
courts have certified pharmaceutical no-injury claims, however,
defendants have settled for multi-million dollar sums.189
B.

Lawsuits On Behalf of People Who Have Driven a Car
Without Incident

Anyone who owns a motor vehicle is likely to be wellversed in what occurs when manufacturers, vehicle owners,
drivers, or others identify a product defect. It is not uncommon
for mechanical or electronic issues to arise with such complex
products. When a defect poses a safety hazard, manufacturers
work with the Department of Transportation’s National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to notify all
registered owners of the affected vehicle of the safety-related
defect and correct the equipment at issue free of charge through
a repair, replacement, or refund.190 This process is intended to
provide a reliable and efficient means of identifying potential
defects, verifying that they pose true safety concerns, and
addressing them at no cost to the driver. According to NHTSA,
since the law’s enactment in 1966, “more than 390 million cars,
trucks, buses, recreational vehicles, motorcycles, and mopeds, as
well as 46 million tires, 66 million pieces of motor vehicle

188 See, e.g., Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 042-01946-02, 2010 WL 3001745, at *13
(Mo. Cir. Ct. July 27, 2010) (denying class certification where plaintiffs failed to
present evidence that the price of the drug was “in any way predicated on the level of
scientific efficacy for which it was proven to have for on-label uses” and therefore the
proposed class “would include more than a small number of uninjured individuals”).
189 See Plubell v. Merck & Co., 289 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming
certification of a class of Missouri residents who were prescribed Vioxx, but experienced no
injury, under the Missouri Merchandizing Practices Act, finding that the plaintiffs could
allege an objective ascertainable loss by claiming that Vioxx was worth less than the
product as represented because the company had not fully disclosed risks associated with
the drug); Carolina Bolado, Merck Puts Up $39M to Settle Vioxx Class Action, LAW360 (Nov.
1, 2012, 10:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/391401/merck-puts-up-39m-to-settlevioxx-class-action (reporting $39 million settlement of Missouri case); Ciaran McEvoy,
Merck To Pay $23M to Settle Vioxx Economic-Loss Claims, LAW360 (July 18, 2013, 2:41
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/458233/merck-to-pay-23m-to-settle-vioxx-economicloss-claims (reporting $23 million settlement of consumer class action seeking economic
losses on behalf of those who used Vioxx without incident outside of Missouri).
190 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118(c), 30120(a), 30163 (2012). NHTSA has authority to
issue vehicle safety standards and require manufacturers to recall vehicles that have
safety-related defects or do not meet Federal safety standards. Id. § 30118(a). A “‘defect’
includes any defect in performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.” Id. § 30102(a)(2). NHTSA receives reports of safety
concerns through a toll free telephone number, website, and mail. See Motor Vehicle
Defects and Safety Recalls: What Every Vehicle Owner Should Know, NHTSA,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallprocess.cfm (last visited May 1, 2015). Recalls
are often voluntarily initiated by manufacturers after they identify a safety issue, but
are sometimes required after NHTSA completes an investigation. See id.

634

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

equipment, and 42 million child safety seats have been recalled
to correct safety defects.”191
Now imagine that these affected drivers, or even a
fraction of them, decided that, because an issue arose with
their vehicle, it was worthwhile to file a lawsuit claiming that
they experienced a loss because they paid for a “problem free”
car or because the resale value of their car had fallen. Courts
have traditionally dismissed claims brought under fraud,
product liability, and other theories where the allegedly
defective product had not malfunctioned,192 and most continue
to reject them.193
These courts recognize that allegations that “[d]iminished
value premised upon a mere possibility of future product failure is
too speculative and uncertain to support a fraud claim.”194 They
have found that plaintiffs who seek to recover the “future
hypothetical diminution in value” of their vehicle, after the
manufacturer has addressed the mechanical issue at no charge,
has shown no ascertainable loss.195 Courts have also found that
a plaintiff who alleges that he would have paid less for a car had
he known of a mechanical issue prior to a recall cannot complain
that he did not receive the benefit of the bargain when he
testifies in a deposition, after the manufacturer repaired the car,
that he is “happy” and it “is working fine.”196 It is particularly

191 Motor Vehicle Defects and Safety Recalls: What Every Vehicle Owner Should
Know, supra note 190, at 1.
192 See Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1999)
(collecting cases); Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, 726 So. 2d 626, 629 (Ala. 1998) (“[C]ourts
have generally concluded that claims based on allegations of inherent product ‘defects’
that have not caused any tangible injury are not viable . . . .”); Tietsworth v. HarleyDavidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 240-41 (Wis. 2004) (citing ten cases decided between
1986 and 2002 as a “representative sample”).
193 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a warranty claim brought by individuals who alleged their vehicles were sold
with tires that were prone to deterioration, but who had not experienced a tire failure,
finding that “[i]f tort law fully compensates those who are physically injured, then any
recoveries by those whose products function properly mean excess compensation. As a
result, most states would not entertain the sort of theory that the plaintiffs press”).
194 Tietsworth, 677 N.W.2d at 240-41 (affirming trial court’s dismissal of class
action by motorcycle owners after manufacturer notified owners that certain engines had
failed and offered an extended warranty and repair kit); see also Wallis v. Ford Motor Co.,
208 S.W.3d 153, 154 (Ark. 2005) (finding that allegation that sport utility vehicles had a
propensity to roll over and that these “inherent design problems” diminished the value of
class member’s SUV’s was not sufficient to sustain a common law fraud claim).
195 Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 872 A.2d 783, 795 (N.J. 2005)
(dismissing class action under New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act alleging economic
losses stemming from faulty fuel valve where manufacturer had provided loan cars and
replaced part at no cost and plaintiffs had not attempted to sell their car).
196 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2013) [hereinafter In re Toyota
Motor Corp] (dismissing nationwide class action brought on behalf of all 2010 Toyota
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improper, as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, to
subject an automaker to treble damages, attorney’s fees, court
costs, as provided by the consumer protection statute of that
state and many others, for “a defect . . . in and of itself” in a
product as complex as a car.197
As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, in these
types of lawsuits, essentially what plaintiffs claim “is that they
are entitled to [an automobile] without any flaws or glitches,
without any reasonably-remediable problems, and without any
of the ordinary tribulations of automobile ownership or lease:
in other words, a perfect car unaffected by the laws of physics
and common sense.”198 Other courts have called such claims
“seriously misguided” and instructed that “[m]erely stating a
creative theory does not establish the actual injury that is
required to prevail on . . . product liability claims.”199
In some instances, courts have found that plaintiffs
bringing such claims meet the minimum requirements for standing
by virtue of purchasing the product at issue or that the plaintiffs
have stated a viable claim, but find that the proposed class fails
to satisfy standards for certification.200 For example, in a
nationwide class action in which GM had voluntarily recalled and
replaced airbags in vehicles that had inadvertently triggered
before the suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that the trial court erred in certifying the class because of
significant variations and conflicts among applicable warranty
law among the states.201 The class, in that case, excluded any
owner who sustained a physical injury as a result of an unexpected
airbag deployment and named as class representatives individuals

Prius and Lexus HS 250h hybrid vehicles after the company conducted a voluntary
recall to address an issue with its anti-lock braking system).
197 Thiedemann, 872 A.2d at 794.
198 Id. at 789.
199 In re Toyota Motor Corp., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
200 See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 598 (9th Cir. 2012);
Cole v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 2007). Courts have divided in other
contexts on the issue of whether class certification is proper where the class representative
has standing, but the class includes members with no plausible claim to damages. Several
federal appellate courts have upheld certification of classes that include members with no
injury. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 265548, at *11 (1st Cir. Jan. 21,
2015); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d. 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014); Kohen v. Pac.
Investment Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d (7th Cir. 2009). Other circuit courts have found that a class
may not be certified when not all members were injured in fact. See, e.g., In re Rail Freight
Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Denney v. Deutsche Bank
AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 801-03
(5th Cir. 2014) (surveying courts taking the Kohen test versus the Denney test in finding
that class members met either test).
201 See Cole, 484 F.3d at 725-26.
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who all had close relationships to the attorneys that filed suit.202
After filing their lawsuit, the plaintiffs turned down an offer from
GM to expedite their repairs, but eventually had their vehicles
fixed.203 The Fifth Circuit recognized that “many jurisdictions
do not permit the recovery of economic loss in vehicle defect
cases where the vehicle has performed satisfactorily and never
manifested the alleged defect,” regardless of whether the claim
is brought in contract or tort law.204 While the court found that
some jurisdictions might permit such claims, since most
jurisdictions likely would not do so, the class representative
failed to show common issues of law predominate.205
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit decertified a nationwide
class action against Honda due to significant variations in state
consumer protection laws. The action raised key issues of
whether a plaintiff must show that a defendant intentionally or
knowingly omitted information and demonstrate reliance on an
alleged misrepresentation, as well as differences in the relief
available under state law, such as statutory damages and
treble damages.206 Even if the class were limited to California
residents, the court found, common issues of fact did not
predominate because “it almost certainly includes members
who were not exposed to, and therefore could not have relied
on, Honda’s allegedly misleading advertising material.”207 In
reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized that state
courts and legislatures have an interest in determining how
broadly to apply consumer protection laws to regulate conduct
and impose liability.208 The court observed that “[m]ore expansive
consumer protection measures may mean more or greater
commercial liability, which in turn may result in higher prices for

202 Id. at 719 (identifying the class representatives as the mother of plaintiffs’
counsel, a paralegal for plaintiffs’ counsel, and the paralegal’s cousin).
203 See id. at 719-20.
204 Id. at 729 (citing Briehl v. Gen. Motor Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 627-28 (8th Cir.
1999) (collecting cases that dismissed claims brought under any theory for allegedly
defective anti-lock braking systems where plaintiffs’ brakes never malfunctioned or
failed)) (also citing other cases dismissing claims seeking economic loss for an
unmanifested alleged defect, including In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig. 7 F. Supp. 2d 792,
805 (E.D. La. 1998) (air bags); Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 99-100 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (integrated child safety seats); Yost v. Gen. Motors Corp., 651 F. Supp. 656, 658
(D.N.J. 1986) (engine leakage); Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp.
595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (tires); Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (rollover risk)).
205 Cole, 484 F.3d at 730.
206 Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 591 (9th Cir. 2012).
207 Id. at 596.
208 See id. at 591-93.
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consumers or a decrease in product availability.”209 Since the
states feel the effects of imposing liability, the Ninth Circuit
found, their legislatures and courts are “entitled to set the
proper balance and boundaries between maintaining consumer
protection, on the one hand, and encouraging an attractive
business climate, on the other hand.”210
Not all courts have put the brakes on claims of this
kind. A few recent successes by plaintiffs’ lawyers in obtaining
class certification or settlement is likely to fuel continued
litigation. For example, in Lloyd v. General Motors Corp.,211 the
Maryland Court of Appeals took what one law professor
characterized as “an unfortunate, unwarranted, and unnecessary
extension of tort law” by holding that unmanifested product
defects are actionable.212 The court reinstated a class action
initially brought by Maryland owners against GM, Ford, and
Chrysler (later adding Saturn), which sought the costs of
strengthening seats in vehicles manufactured throughout the
1990s.213 The class, which expressly excluded anyone who
experienced a personal injury in a crash, alleged that the seatbacks
had a tendency to collapse rearward in rear-impact collisions.214
Professor Rebecca Korzec of the University of Baltimore
School of Law criticized the opinion as ignoring the
fundamental difference between tort and contract law.215 Since
the plaintiffs had not suffered physical harm, she noted, their
only injury was that they did not receive the car seats for which
they paid.216 Seeking the lost “benefit of the bargain,” she
explains, is the province of contract law and claims that a
product fails to meet a buyer’s expectations are typically barred
209 Id. at 592 (citing White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1017-18 (9th Cir
2002) and Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58
ALA. L. REV. 73, 109 (2006)).
210 Id. While many courts have dismissed claims alleging unmanifested defects
under state consumer protection acts, they have reached similar results when considering
breach of warranty, common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and other claims.
See, e.g., Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It is well
established that purchasers of an allegedly defective product have no legally recognizable
claim where the alleged defect has not manifested itself in the product they own.”); Yost
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 651 F. Supp. 656, 657-58 (D.N.J. 1986) (“Damage is a necessary
element of both counts—breach of warranty and common law fraud.”); Am. Suzuki Motor
Corp. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
the vast majority of vehicles at issue performed as they were intended and, thus, were “fit
for their ordinary purpose”).
211 Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257 (Md. 2007).
212 Rebecca Korzec, Lloyd v. General Motors Corporation: An Unfortunate Detour
in Maryland Products Liability Law, 38 U. BALT. L.F. 127, 128 (2008).
213 Lloyd, 916 A.2d at 262.
214 See id. at 263.
215 Korzec, supra note 212, at 127, 136.
216 See id. at 129-30.
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in tort suits by the economic loss doctrine.217 “Providing tort
compensation only after injury occurs ensures that the extent
of injury and the identity of the injured parties is more than
speculative.”218 Alleging a tort claim, Professor Korzec observes,
provides a plaintiff with the ability to threaten a defendant
with punitive damages, a remedy not available in contract
claims.219 Although punitive damages are rarely awarded, such
liability exposure may inflate the settlement value of a class
action. The court’s ruling also essentially transformed a basic
warranty claim into a consumer protection claim,220 effectively
eliminating a requirement that private plaintiffs under
Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act show actual “injury or
loss sustained” as a result of the prohibited practice and
authorizing them to seek recovery of attorneys’ fees.221
The culmination of these types of claims is the Toyota
“sudden unintended acceleration” lawsuits. After widespread
media coverage on the topic in 2010, Toyota was hit with a surge
of claims alleging that the electronics system in certain vehicles
can result in “sudden unintended acceleration.” While about 400
people alleged they experienced personal injuries, wrongful
death, or property damage as a result of a defect in the cars,222
class action lawsuits sought recovery for economic losses on
behalf of an estimated 22 million owners.223 The class actions
claimed that, while those owners of Toyota vehicles were not
physically harmed, the risk of product failure led to a decrease
in the resale value of their cars, causing them a financial loss.
Studies by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) found no evidence of a defect in the
throttle, braking, software, or electronics.224 Rather, “[a]fter
See id. at 130-37.
Id. at 149.
219 See id. at 138.
220 See Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 281 (Md. 2007).
221 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408(a) (2014).
222 See MDL STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 171 (reporting total of 423 actions
transferred to In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices,
and Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2151 (C.D. Cal.)).
223 See Order Granting Motion for Final Appproval of Proposed Class Action
Settlement, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML 02151 JVS (FMOx) (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2013) [hereinafter
Final Sudden Acceleration Settlement Order].
224 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF TOYOTA ELECTRIC THROTTLE CONTROL (ETC) SYSTEMS (2011),
[hereinafter NHTSA ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/
NHTSA-UA_report.pdf; see also Editorial, Toyota’s Acceleration Problem Could be
Customer-Based, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/05/AR2010090502878.html.
217

218
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conducting the most exacting study of a motor vehicle electronic
control system ever performed by a government agency,” NASA
found, and NHTSA agreed, that accidents were likely either the
result of a pedal becoming entrapped under a floor mat or the
driver pushing the wrong pedal.225
U.S. District Judge James Selna, presiding over the
multi-district docket encompassing all sudden unintended
acceleration claims pending in federal courts, found that the
plaintiffs had satisfied the minimum threshold for standing,
regardless of whether they experienced the alleged defect, but
cautioned that “[w]hether they can recover for that injury
under a particular theory of liability is a separate question.”226
He later declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims, based on
application of California case law, while recognizing that “a
number of states . . . would preclude or would highly likely
preclude some or all of the claims asserted by Plaintiffs whose
products have manifested no defect.”227
Nevertheless, in December 2012, Toyota announced a
settlement of the economic loss claims to put litigation behind
it,228 which the court approved in July 2013.229 The $1.1 billion
settlement creates a fund to pay anyone who owned, purchased,
or leased any of about forty Toyota, Lexus, or Scion models made
between 1998 and 2010.230 The court also approved payment of
225 NHTSA ASSESSMENT, supra note 224, at vii; see also TRANSP. RESEARCH BD.,
THE SAFETY PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS: INSIGHTS FROM
UNINTENDED ACCELERATION, SPECIAL REP. NO. 308 165 (2012), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13342 (agreeing with NHTSA’s decision to close
its investigation after its initial study, followed by NASA’s study, found that electronic
throttle control systems were not a plausible cause of reports of sudden unintended
acceleration and recommending that NHTSA expand its expertise in automotive electronics
to more effectively investigate and handle public concern in this area in the future). Toyota
won three of its first four product liability trials. See Jaclyn Trop, Toyota Seeks a Settlement
for Sudden Acceleration Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/12/14/business/toyota-seeks-settlement-for-lawsuits.html (reporting that Toyota
received defense verdicts after trials in New York in 2011, Philadelphia in June 2013, and
Los Angeles in October 2013, before settling an Oklahoma City case after a $3 million
verdict in October 2013).
226 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices,
and Prod. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
227 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices,
and Prod. Liab. Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Alabama, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin case law, as examples of jurisdictions
likely to dismiss such claims and denying a motion to certify application of California
law to nationwide class action).
228 See Press Release, Toyota Announces Settlement of Economic Loss Litigation
That Provides Value to Customers (Dec. 26, 2012), available at http://pressroom.toyota.com/
releases/toyota+settlement+litigation+value+customers+dec26.htm.
229 See Final Sudden Acceleration Settlement Order, supra note 223.
230 See id. Objectors charged that it was improper to use $30 million of the
settlement to promote driver education when the settlement alleged a design defect.
Ultimately, these objections led to a shift of $1.5 million to auto safety groups. See
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$200 million in the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and $27 million in
expenses separate from the settlement fund to be divided
among the 31 plaintiffs’ firms that worked on the litigation as
they deem appropriate.231
The settlement is reportedly the largest of its type in
automobile history.232 At the time the settlement received final
approval, however, just over two percent of those who were
mailed a notice of the settlement filed a claim.233 Under the
settlement’s terms, even those who do not file a claim will
receive a check in the mail good for ninety days and, if they fail
to cash the check, they will receive a reminder notice and
another check.234 A controversial cy pres provision will distribute
unclaimed funds to five law schools to establish fellowships to
research low participation rates in class action settlements.235
The Toyota settlement is a potential game changer in noinjury litigation and its impact is likely to be felt beyond the
automobile industry. It sends a message to plaintiffs’ lawyers
that it is more profitable to be among the first to file a consumer
class action for speculative economic losses on behalf of anyone
who purchased a product rather than compete to represent a
limited number of people whose physical injury may have been
caused by a defect.236 Taking the consumer class action route
Juan Carlos Rodriguez, $1.1B Toyota Suit Moves Ahead With Objector Settlement,
LAW360 (Jan. 9, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/499948/1-1b-toyotasuit-moves-ahead-with-objector-settlement.
231 Order Regarding Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses,
and Compensation to Named Plaintiffs, at 2-3, 20, In re Toyota Motor Corp.
Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10-ML02151 JVS (FMOx) (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the settlement resulted
in additional litigation over the amount and allocation of attorneys’ fees among the
plaintiffs’ lawyers. See Megan Stride, Attys’ Fee War Accelerates Between Firms in $1B
Toyota Deal, LAW360 (Aug. 6, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/463051/
attys-fee-war-accelerates-between-firms-in-1b-toyota-deal.
232 See W.J. Hennigan, Toyota Settlement in Sudden-Acceleration Case Will Top
$1 Billion, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/26/business/lafi-toyota-to-pay-at-least-12-billion-to-settle-suddenacceleration-lawsuit-20121226;
Bill
Vlasic, Toyota Agrees to Settle Lawsuit Tied to Accelerations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/business/toyota-settles-lawsuit-over-acceleratorrecalls-impact.html.
233 See Amanda Bronstad, $1.6 Billion Toyota Settlement Wins Final Approval,
NAT’L L.J. (July 22, 2013) (reporting that only 500,000 owners of 22.5 million who were
sent a notice filed a claim).
234 $1.6B Toyota ‘Runaway Vehicle’ Settlement Expected to be Approved Today,
L.A. DAILY NEWS (July 18, 2013), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130719/
16b-toyota-runaway-vehicle-settlement-expected-to-be-approved-today.
235 See Amanda Bronstad, Objections Mount to $1.6 Billion Toyota Settlement,
NAT’L L.J. (May 14, 2013) (discussing objections to cy pres proposal).
236 In addition to claims seeking lost value or refunds from manufacturers on
the basis of latent defects, auto dealerships and rental companies have also faced noinjury claims. See Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., No. 98985, 2013 WL 4238945, at *19
n.8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2013) (Rocco, J., dissenting) (affirming certification of a
class of all purchasers of automobiles from a group of dealerships that included an
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also allows for extrapolation of damages to thousands or millions
of people and may provide a basis for recovery of statutory
damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs under
some state consumer protection laws. Indeed, within three
months of the Toyota verdict, thirteen plaintiffs’ law firms
brought a similar sudden unintended acceleration lawsuit
against Ford.237 In addition, the same attorneys involved in the
Toyota litigation are now claiming a loss in resale value of
millions of General Motors’s vehicles following recalls
addressing potentially faulty ignition switches.238
C.

Comcast v. Behrend, Washing Machines, and the Future
of No-Injury Class Actions Certification

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast v. Behrend,239
combined with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,240 provides new
ammunition for defense counsel when responding to attempts to
certify no-injury class actions. In Comcast, the Court signaled a
problem with class actions that lacked a nexus between the
theory of liability and an assessment of common damages.241 In
Wal-Mart, the Court warned that shortcuts to establishing
classwide liability and damages through engaging in “Trial by
invalid arbitration clause in purchase contracts, regardless of whether a dispute arose
that placed the arbitration clause at issue, and summarily awarding $200 in
“discretionary damages” to each class member); but cf. Hershenow v. Enterprise RentA-Car Co. of Boston, 840 N.E.2d 526, 535 (Mass. 2006) (finding class failed to state a
claim under Massachusetts consumer protection law when they alleged they that a
rental agreement contained an unlawful “collision damage waiver” provision
purporting to waive the rental company’s claims against a renter for potential vehicle
damage when the class members returned the vehicles undamaged; plaintiffs had not
suffered any injury because they never had to make a claim under the provision and,
therefore, were not “worse off during the rental period than [they] would have been had
the CDW complied in full” with Massachusetts law).
237 See Class Action Complaint at 4-5, Belville v. Ford Motor Co., Civil Action
No. 3:13-cv-6529, 2013 WL 1281238 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2013); see also Christopher
Jensen, Suit Claims Ford Failed to Protect Vehicles From Unintended Acceleration,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2013), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/suit-claims-fordfailed-to-protect-vehicles-from-unintended-acceleration/. The district court’s dismissal of
claims brought on behalf of individuals who had used their vehicles without incident for
many years in that case may at least slightly damper enthusiasm for no-injury claims
stemming from the Toyota settlement. See Belville v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F. Supp. 3d
528, 533 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); see also id. at 542 (noting that the court “has not found
any comparable cases that have allowed such claims to survive”). The court also
dismissed the plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims because they failed to state with particularity
the alleged misrepresentation, quoted only broad statements about safety that were
“mere puffery,” and did not assert that they actually saw or relied on misstatements in
making their purchases. See id. at 543-46.
238 See Linda Sandler et al., Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Compete to Lead Ignition
Switch Battle, BLOOMBERG BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (Aug. 11, 2014).
239 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
240 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
241 Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
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Formula” impermissibly abridge a defendant’s right to due
process.242 These requirements present a challenge to certifying
class actions where only the class representative can show an
injury or where damages are based on an alleged diminution in
value of a product that will vary in individual cases.
In Comcast, cable television subscribers in the
Philadelphia area alleged that they paid higher prices as a result
of the cable provider’s strategy of swapping their cable systems
with competitors to “cluster” their operations in the region.243 The
plaintiffs sought class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires “that the questions of law or fact common to the class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.”244 While the plaintiffs proposed four theories of anticompetitive behavior that impacted subscribers, the district court
only accepted one as capable of being proven class-wide when it
certified the class. Yet, the plaintiffs offered testimony by an
expert who used a model to calculate damages based on all four
theories of antitrust impact, instead of just the one theory
accepted by the court. The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s reliance on the plaintiffs’ damages model, finding that at
the class certification stage, plaintiffs did not have to “tie each
theory of [harm] to an exact calculation of damages.”245
The Supreme Court’s five-member majority reversed the
Third Circuit’s affirmation of class certification, emphasizing that
the theory of harm accepted by the district court must match the
basis for calculating damages across the entire class.246 As the
Court explained, “at the class certification stage (as at trial), any
model supporting a plaintiff’s damages case must be consistent
with its liability case.”247 Otherwise, “[q]uestions of individual
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common
to the class.”248 The Court also clarified that the “rigorous
analysis” required by Rule 23 may require consideration of merits
issues that overlap with class certification prerequisites.249 The

Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
244 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
245 Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1431 (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655
F.3d 182, 206 (3d Cir. 2011)).
246 Id. at 1435 (“There is no question that the model failed to measure
damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which [Comcast’s] liability in
this action is premised.”).
247 Id. at 1433.
248 Id.
249 Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
242
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D.C. Circuit has summarized the holding of Comcast as: “No
damages model, no predominance, no class certification.”250
Comcast built on the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in
Wal-Mart, where the Court unanimously reversed certification of
a nationwide class action alleging the retailer’s employment
practices had a disparate impact on women. There, the plaintiffs
proposed determining liability and backpay owed from a sample
of class members, then multiplying the number of valid claims by
the average backpay to determine recovery for the entire class.251
This “novel project,” the Court found, would impermissibly use
class certification to modify a substantive right because it would
preclude Wal-Mart from litigating defenses to individual
claims.252 Some of these individuals may not have experienced an
injury as a result of illegal practices, but could have been denied
an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.253 Yet, through
“Trial by Formula,” these uninjured class members would
receive backpay.254
Claims brought against washing machine manufacturers,
alleging front-load machines have a design flaw making them
prone to mold growth,255 provided the first test as to how courts
would apply these decisions to class actions that include members
who experienced no injury from an alleged product defect. In an
Ohio class action, the plaintiffs asserted claims against the
Whirlpool Corporation for tortious breach of warranty, negligent
design, and negligent failure to warn over the alleged growth of
mold in front-loading washing machines.256 Plaintiffs asserted
similar breach-of-warranty claims against Sears, Roebuck & Co.
over mold growth in its washers in an Illinois case.257 Both
manufacturers argued that the classes were overbroad because
most washing machine owners did not have a mold issue and
were pleased with their purchases.258
The district courts certified the Whirlpool and Sears
classes and the appellate courts affirmed while Comcast was
pending before the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit ruled
250 In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252-53
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
251 See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See id.
255 Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2012), reinstated,
727 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods.
Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom,
aff’d, 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013).
256 Whirlpool, 678 F.3d at 412.
257 Butler, 702 F.3d at 361.
258 Butler, 702 F.3d at 362; Whirlpool, 678 F.3d at 420.
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that certification is appropriate “if class members complain of a
pattern or practice that is generally applicable to the class as a
whole[,]” which the court found was implicated by the plaintiffs’
claims of common design flaws in the machines.259 “Even if some
class members have not been injured by the challenged practice,”
the court found, “a class may nevertheless be appropriate.”260 The
Seventh Circuit agreed. It found that the basic question raised by
the mold claim was common to the entire class, and that the
class action mechanism “is the more efficient procedure” for
resolving whether the machines are defective.261
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and
remanded the washing machine decisions for reconsideration in
light of Comcast. In doing so, the Court appeared to send a
message that it expected lower courts to more closely evaluate
whether damages claimed in a putative class action fit the
alleged harm.262 On remand, however, the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits reaffirmed their earlier rulings. The appellate courts
focused on language in Comcast that requires a showing of
predominance at the class certification stage263 and applied that
holding only to liability instead of liability and damage
considerations. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
wondered, “[W]hy did the Supreme Court remand the case to us
for reconsideration in light of that [Comcast] decision?”264 The
Seventh Circuit answered its own question by declaring that
Comcast emphasized that predominance must be satisfied by
proof at the class certification stage, but found that “[i]f the issues
of liability are genuinely common issues, and the damages of
individual class members can be readily determined in individual
hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of subclasses,
the fact that damages are not identical across all class members
should not preclude class certification.”265
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Comcast from the
Whirlpool case by noting that the issues of liability and damages
had been bifurcated in the latter. Like the Seventh Circuit in
Butler, the Sixth Circuit found that that the plaintiffs met their
Whirlpool, 678 F.3d. at 420.
Id.
261 Butler, 702 F.3d at 362.
262 John H. Beisner et al., From Cable TV to Washing Machines: The Supreme
Court Cracks Down on Class Actions, BLOOMBERG LAW-BNA (May 8, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/from-cable-tv-to-washing-machines-the-supreme-court-cracks-downon-class-actions/.
263 See In re Whirlpool Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d
838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013); Butler, 727 F.3d at 800.
264 Butler, 727 F.3d at 800.
265 Id. at 800-01.
259

260

2015]

“EMPTY SUIT” LITIGATION

645

obligation to show predominance by showing that liability issues
are susceptible to proof on a class-wide basis.266 The Sixth Circuit
began with the premise that the plaintiffs need only raise “one
common question to certify a class,” and found that the validity of
the class members’ claim centered on whether design defects in
the machines caused mold growth and “whether Whirlpool
adequately warned” its customers when it began receiving
complaints.267 The court found that “the trial of common questions
will evoke common answers likely to drive resolution of this
lawsuit”268 and found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying a liability class.
Both courts dismissed the manufacturers’ arguments
that the class lacked predominance because most of the
members suffered no injury,269 with the Seventh Circuit adding
that the lack of injury was “an argument not for refusing to
certify the class but for certifying it and then entering a
judgment that would largely exonerate Sears—a course it
should welcome, as all class members who did not opt out of the
class action would be bound by the judgment.”270
The Supreme Court denied review of recertification of
the Whirlpool and Butler cases.271 Rather than settle, however,
Whirlpool fought on, resulting in a rare class action trial in a
federal district court in Cleveland, Ohio. After just two hours of
deliberation, the jury returned a defense verdict.272 The jury
found the plaintiffs had not shown that Whirlpool negligently
designed its machines or breached its warranty.273
The impact of Comcast and Wal-Mart on no-injury class
actions remains uncertain. Comcast has the potential to
discourage no-injury consumer class actions by requiring a close
fit between the damages sought and the harm alleged. Wal-Mart
should aid in preventing certification of classes based on
Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 860.
Id. at 853.
268 Id. at 857-58 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011)); see also Butler, 727 F.3d at 801.
269 Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 857 (citing Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am.,
LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming class certification in a case alleging
that an alignment defect caused premature tire wear, even though a majority of class
members’ vehicles did not manifest the tire wear)).
270 Butler, 727 F.3d at 799.
271 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014); Whirlpool Corp.
v. Glazer, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014).
272 See James F. McCarty, Federal Jury Rejects Class-Action Lawsuit
Brought Against Whirlpool Front-loading Washing Machines, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2014/10/federal_
jury_rejects_class-act.html.
273 See Allison v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 1:08-WP-65001 (N.D. Ohio) (Verdict
Form, Oct. 30, 2014).
266

267
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statistical models that attribute injuries to individuals who have
not experienced a loss. As of yet, however, the potential of these
cases has not been fully realized.
Courts have certified classes while acknowledging that
individualized issues in calculating damages may arise later.274
Courts have also certified classes with respect to “particular
issues,” such as liability, even when Rule 23 safeguards do not
warrant class treatment in regard to the damages alleged.275
Some courts have allowed plaintiffs to establish classwide
damages through expert testimony showing that a product’s
“true market price” was less than the retail price due to a
failure to disclose a safety hazard or found that the availability of
statutory damages under a state’s consumer protection law avoids
the need for individualized inquiries or expert testimony.276
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition in Wal-Mart against
“Trial by Formula,” some courts have permitted certification of
classes based on sampling where there is substantial variation
between class members and some have experienced no injury.277
274 See, e.g., Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-02890-H (BGS), 2013
WL 5664985, at *10 (S.D. Cal. July 30, 2013); Munoz v. PHH Corp., No. 1:08-cv-0759AWI-BAM, 2013 WL 2146925, at *24, 26 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013) (recommendation by
a Magistrate Judge to certify the class).
275 For example, in a pre-Comcast decision, the Seventh Circuit found it
appropriate to certify one “common issue” of “whether windows suffer from a single,
inherent design defect leading to wood rot,” while the issue of damages could be dealt
with in individual follow-on proceedings. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393
(7th Cir. 2010). Following Comcast, in In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prod. Liab., 757 F.3d
599 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit declined to overrule Pella. It reversed a trial
court’s decision finding a class of purchasers of roofing shingles that were allegedly
deceptively marketed could not be certified because their varied experiences with the
tiles precluded common damages. See id. at 602. Instead, the Seventh Circuit
suggested that the plaintiffs seek uniform damages on behalf of the entire class based
on the difference in the value of the tile as represented and a tile that did not mean
certain industry standards. Id. at 600.
276 See, e.g., Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465
CAS (JCx), 2013 WL 3353857, at *9, *15 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2013) (inviting plaintiffs to renew
motion for certification upon obtaining expert testimony showing the difference in value
between a $5.99 hairstyling product with and without a flammability warning on the label,
and certifying New York class because the availability of statutory damages of $50 per
violation under the state’s consumer protection law provided a measure of classwide
damages that made an individualized inquiry unnecessary).
277 See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir.
2014) (affirming certification of antitrust claim based on expert testimony extrapolating
aggregate damages from a sample of class members who had varying degrees of injury,
and in many cases no injury at all); Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 797800 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming class certification of wage-and-hour lawsuit based on
statistical evidence of the time a fictional “average” employee would spend on donning
and doffing-related activities, despite significant differences in job responsibilities and
required safety equipment, and evidence that many class members had no damages). But
see Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting, in
wage-and-hour suit, proposal to extrapolate from the experience of 42 “representative”
employees to 2,341 class members who worked varying hours because it would confer a
windfall on some members while undercompensating others).
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These decisions offer plaintiffs several potential routes to class
certification post-Comcast and Wal-Mart. To avoid Comcast
complications, plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to work with
economists to develop more sophisticated damages models
early in the litigation, more frequently seek certification of
liability-only classes, or file class actions under laws providing
for statutory damages.278
Other courts are relying on Comcast and Wal-Mart to
deny certification of such claims.279 For example, a California
district court decertified a class composed of all persons who had
purchased Pom Wonderful juice during a five-year period and
claimed the manufacturer had made deceptive representations
about the health benefits of its products.280 The plaintiffs alleged
two alternative theories of damages: they either sought a full
refund on the cost of products on the basis that they would not
have purchased the products if the company had accurately
advertised them or claimed they were entitled to the premium
price they paid for the Pom products above ordinary juice
278 Approximately one third of state consumer protection acts provide for
statutory damages. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 2, at 22 n.13 (compiling
statutes). All but about five of these states allow for recovery of statutory damages
through a class action as well as an individual claim. See id. at 29. Several federal laws
also provide for statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. See, e.g., Fair and Accurate
Transaction Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2014); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 1681n (2012); Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3), 277(c)(5)
(2012). Even prior to Comcast, plaintiffs’ law firms have expanded their use of these
statutes to bring class actions. See, e.g., James G. Snell & Carlos P. Mino, TCPA,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.bna.com/telephone-consumer-protectionact-cases-are-on-the-rise/ (reporting a 54% increase in TCPA class actions between
August 2011 and August 2012).
279 See, e.g., Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1084-87 (7th Cir. 2014)
(Posner, J.) (finding that the district court was not required to determine whether each
of 150 class members suffered an injury from alleged groundwater determination, but
reversing class certification because the district court “treated predominance as a
pleading requirement” and failed to examine “the realism of the plaintiffs’ injury and
damages model” where the defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ homes may have lost
value due to declining real estate values and the benzene may not have entered their
water supply); Cabbat v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., Civil No. 10-00162 DKW/BMK, 2014
WL 32172, at *9-12 (D. Haw. Jan. 6, 2014) (finding certification of a class of smokers who
purchased light cigarettes for reasons other than health benefits, which include
individuals who suffered no injury, was not apt for classwide resolution and failed to
present a methodology for determining the lost benefit of the bargain as required by
Comcast); Gooden v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-2595-JAM-DAD, 2013 WL
6499250, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2013) (denying certification of a class alleging
mortgage holder had required owner to obtain insurance in excess of the property’s
replacement cost because the court would need to assess the replacement value of each
home to determine whether a class member suffered an actual injury); Martin v. Ford
Motor Co., 292 F.R.D. 252, 274-76 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that where 83.2% of the
vehicles at issue had not malfunctioned, expert testimony on the impact of a recall on
the resale value was not sufficient for class certification purposes because the resale
value of a vehicle is based on multitude of individual factors); see also infra Part IV.
280 In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML-02199
DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014).
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products resulting from the alleged nutritional value
misrepresentations.281 Although the court declined to adopt an
“expansive reading of Comcast” that requires a damages model
to distinguish between injured and uninjured persons,282 it
found the two approaches failed to provide a classwide measure
of damages. The “full refund” approach did not account for the
value consumers received in consuming the product.283 Such an
award would not constitute restitution, but would provide
consumers with an “unexpected boon” and profit from a
windfall.284 The “price premium” model simply assumed that the
price difference between Pom and other juice products is
attributable to Pom’s alleged health representations, rather
than a myriad of other potential consumer motivations in
purchasing a more expensive product.285 The classwide damages
were not sufficiently tied to Pom’s alleged misrepresentations,
the court found.286
The outcome of the Whirlpool bellwether trial suggests
that even when courts certify no-injury class actions, jurors may
not be persuaded by such cases. It remains to be seen whether
the defense verdict will increase the willingness of businesses to
take high-risk class actions to trial, rather than settle.
D.

Is Regulatory Action More Effective for Addressing the
Potential for Future Harm Than Litigation?

In light of all of these relevant decisions, let us return to
our basic question: are class action claims based on potential
harms caused by products empty suit litigation? A fundamental
flaw in class actions seeking recovery for unmanifested defects
is the assumption that private litigation is an effective means
of protecting the public from hazardous products before an
injury occurs. Some court rulings that have permitted these
claims, such as the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision in
Lloyd,287 overlook or discount a key part of the safety net: the
role of government agencies in preventing future harm through
issuing safety standards and recalling dangerous products. These
agencies were created, in part, due to recognition that private
litigation does not provide an efficient or effective means of
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

See id. at *1, *5.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.
See discussion supra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
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proactively addressing consumer safety.288 Several federal
agencies are empowered to order recalls (and push companies to
conduct recalls on a voluntary basis) that require manufacturers
to provide repairs or replacements at no cost or refunds to
consumers where evidence indicates noncompliance with a
safety standard or a possible safety hazard. These agencies
include the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),
NHTSA, and the FDA.
Regulatory action has significant advantages for consumers
over no-injury class actions. While government agencies are often
chastised for moving like molasses, such criticism often reflects the
length of the rulemaking or adjudicatory process rather than
recalls,289 which are carried out relatively quickly and often with
the cooperation of manufacturers. For example, the Consumer
Product Safety Act requires companies to report a defect
“immediately” upon identifying a potential hazard,290 which the
CPSC interprets as within 24 hours of reaching such a
determination and with no more than ten business days of
investigation.291 Its award-winning “Fast Track” program often
leads companies to present a Corrective Action Plan to the
agency for addressing the safety concern within twenty business
days of filing an incident report.292 Similarly, federal law
requires automakers to notify NHTSA within five business days
of determining that a safety-related defect exists or that the
vehicle is not in compliance with federal motor vehicle safety
standards and to promptly conduct a recall.293 Manufacturers
often voluntarily issue recalls, rather than engage in protracted
administrative proceedings or litigation.294 This avoids the need

288 See NAT’L COMM’N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT PRESENTED TO THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 1-3 (1970) (concluding that the common law tort claims
were unreliable in restraining product hazards because it was most concerned with
providing post-injury remedies).
289 It is important to recognize that the relatively slow process for
promulgating binding rules that regulate products or conduct reflects a need, required
by law, for the agency to hear, carefully consider, and respond to public comment, and
for the agency to ensure that regulations are supported by statutory authority, wellreasoned, and backed by sound science. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). This process,
while sometimes time-consuming, can have significant benefits for public safety.
290 See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (2012).
291 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, RECALL HANDBOOK 8 (2012)
[hereinafter CPSC RECALL HANDBOOK], available at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/
106141/8002.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015).
292 See Conditions Under Which the Staff Will Refrain From Making
Preliminary Hazard Determinations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,827 (July 24, 1997); CPSC
RECALL HANDBOOK, supra note 291, at 15-16.
293 49 C.F.R. §§ 573.6(b), 577.2 (2011); see also 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c) (2012).
294 For example, the CPSC worked with regulated companies to implement
over 1,000 voluntary recalls between January 2010 and November 2013, while issuing
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for consumers (or regulators) to prove an actual defect exists,
even as the company addresses product safety concerns. When
a manufacturer fails to promptly report a safety issue, agencies
are authorized to impose substantial civil fines,295 which can
rise into the millions of dollars.296 Knowing failure to report a
safety concern can result in criminal fines in the billions297 and
potential jail time for corporate executives.298
Class action litigation typically proceeds at a far slower
pace than addressing safety concerns through recalls. Take, for
example, the Toyota sudden unintended acceleration litigation.
Since 2009, Toyota has recalled eleven million vehicles and
addressed concerns that accelerator pedals could become entrapped
by floor mats and that pedal assemblies were susceptible to
sticking.299 Such repairs are made at no cost to the owners.300 While
NHTSA fined Toyota in 2012 for not earlier reporting concerns
with two Lexus models,301 in the vast majority of cases the cars of
no mandatory recalls. Voluntary Remedial Actions and Guidelines for Voluntary
Recall, 78 Fed. Reg. 69,793, 69,794 (Nov. 21, 2013) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt 1115).
295 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a) (2012) (authorizing civil penalties of up to
$100,000 per violation and up to $15 million for a related series of violations, for failure
to timely report a known hazard in a consumer product); 49 U.S.C. § 30165 (2012)
(authorizing civil penalties on automakers of up to $5,000 per violation and up to $35
million for a related series of violations).
296 See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Ross Stores Agrees to
$3.9 Million Civil Penalty, Internal Compliance Improvements for Failure to Report
Drawstrings in Children’s Upper Outerwear (June 21, 2013), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2013/Ross-Stores-Agrees-to-39-MillionCivil-Penalty-Internal-Compliance-Improvements-for-Failure-to-Report-Drawstrings-inChildrens-Upper-Outerwear-/; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Nat’l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., Toyota Motor Corp. Will Pay Record $17.35 Million in Civil Penalties for
Alleged Violations of Federal Law (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter NHTSA Press Release],
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2012/Toyota+Motor
+Corp.+Will+Pay+Record+$17.35+Million+in+Civil+Penalties+for+Alleged+Violations
+of+Federal+Law (reporting imposition of $17.35 million civil penalty on Toyota, pursuant
to settlement agreement, for its failure to report and recall two Lexus models along with
earlier recalled models, and noting that Toyota agreed to pay $48.8 million as a result of
three separate investigations into the automaker’s handling of pedal entrapment, sticky
pedal and steering relay rod recalls in 2010).
297 See, e.g., Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion
Settlement to End Probe of Accelerator Problems, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/toyota-reaches-12-billion-settlement-toend-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html
(reporting that “the settlement, which amounts to more than a third of Toyota’s 2013 profit,
is being called the largest criminal penalty imposed on a car company in U.S. history”).
298 See Aruna Viswanatha et al., Toyota’s $1.2 Billion Settlement May Be Model for
U.S. Probe Into GM, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/03/19/us-toyota-settlement-idUSBREA2I0VB20140319 (quoting former Public Citizen
president Joan Claybrook).
299 See Jaclyn Trop, Toyota Seeks a Settlement for Sudden Acceleration Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/business/toyota-seekssettlement-for-lawsuits.html?_r=0.
300 See 49 C.F.R. 573.6(c)(8) (2008).
301 See NHTSA Press Release, supra note 296.
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affected owners were modified to address any issues prior to the
class action settlement. By way of contrast, the court gave final
approval to Toyota’s settlement of economic loss claims in July
2013,302 and objections to the settlement were not resolved until
January 2014, clearing the way for the plaintiffs’ law firm to
begin to distribute payments to class members.303 The low
response rate to the settlement may suggest that Toyota owners
already had their concerns fully addressed through these recalls.
By the time of the settlement, most Toyota owners may not have
viewed themselves as having an unaddressed injury.
The typical class action, like the Toyota case, takes two or
three years to settle, a period that is likely to run significantly
longer in complex cases or when litigants appeal the trial
court’s ruling on class certification.304 For example, the
Maryland lawsuit challenging seatback design continued for
twelve years. As detailed earlier, the Lloyd lawsuit was filed by
plaintiffs in 1999, dismissed by the trial court as barred by the
economic loss doctrine in 2000, affirmed by an intermediate
appellate court in 2002, and reversed and reinstated by
Maryland’s highest court in 2007.305 But that was not the end of
the story. Following reinstatement of their claims, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint (for the fourth time) to add five new
named plaintiffs and “significantly expanded the class of
vehicles” covered by the lawsuit.306 The original plaintiffs, the
Lloyds, no longer owned their 1995 Saturn and had purchased a
1997 Dodge Minivan, another vehicle covered by the lawsuit.307
These changes triggered federal court jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act, allowing the defendants to remove
the case from state court.308 Meanwhile, three of the four
defendants, GM, Saturn, and Chrysler, filed for bankruptcy
protection in 2009.309
302 Final Order Approving Class Action Settlement at 1, In re Toyota Motor
Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No.
8:10ML 02151 JVS (FMOx) (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2013).
303 Juan Carlos Rodriguez, $1.1B Toyota Suit Moves Ahead with Objector
Settlement, LAW360 (Jan. 9, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/499948/11b-toyota-suit-moves-ahead-with-objector-settlement.
304 See TED FRANK, MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, CLASS ACTIONS,
ARBITRATION, AND CONSUMER RIGHTS: WHY CONCEPCION IS A PRO-CONSUMER DECISION 5
(2013), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_16.pdf (citing OFFICE OF
COURT RESEARCH, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2000-2006: FIRST INTERIM REPORT 15-16 (Mar. 2009), available
at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf).
305 Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715-17 (D. Md. 2008).
306 See id. at 717.
307 See id.
308 Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 560 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (D. Md. 2008).
309 Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 266 F.R.D. 98, 102 (D. Md. 2010).
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There are three scenarios that can play out when
government regulations establish a recall process for addressing a
potential defect and consumer class actions seek recovery for an
unmanifested defect. Each suggests that litigation is not as
effective as the recall process for promptly addressing a safety
issue. This, in turn, indicates that such claims might be deemed
empty suit litigation.
In the first scenario, a federal agency has not required a
recall or taken other action related to the safety concern. For
example, a California district court denied certification of a claim
alleging that a motorcycle released excessive heat, posing a risk of
distracting the driver, and seeking to recover the amount owners
allegedly overpaid for their motorcycles.310 The court found that if
there is a safety issue with the motorcycles, the plaintiffs “can
petition NHTSA to investigate, and if [the agency] finds [a] defect
related to . . . safety, it [can require the manufacturers] to fix the
defect.”311 This administrative remedy for uninjured class
members, the court found, was superior to class action litigation
for fairly and efficiently resolving the concern.312
When an agency has not taken regulatory action after
years of litigation over a safety concern, there is a question as to
whether the concern is backed by science and whether any
damages awarded will actually further safety purposes. This
scenario is exemplified by the Maryland seatback case, in which
NHTSA had not ordered a recall even after a decade of litigation
and the manufacturers argued that the cars fully complied with
federal safety standards. In denying class certification, the
federal district court took these arguments into account, finding
that, should the plaintiffs prevail, a lay jury would essentially
rewrite the seat rigidity standards set by government safety
experts.313 “If the suit resulted in the award of a few thousand
dollars to each class member, it is unlikely that the class
member would use the award to repair the problem,” the court
found.314 “It is much more likely that the class member would
simply pocket the award” than replace the seats in their
310 See Johnson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Group, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 573,
584-85 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
311 Id. at 584.
312 Id. (citing Kia Motors Am. Corp. v. Butler, 985 So. 2d 1133, 1142 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008)).
313 See Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.R.D. 224, 227 (D. Md. 2011) (“Plaintiffs
would have asked a lay jury, unaided by the agency’s expertise, special knowledge, and
ability to test, to overrule NHTSA by declaring defective any seatback below the 20,000
inch-pound threshold.”); Lloyd, 266 F.R.D. at 106-07 (finding that “the practical effect of a
class victory would be to re-write FMVSS 207” as “a jury would supplant NHTSA on the
issue of seatback rigidity”).
314 Lloyd, 275 F.R.D.at 233.
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vehicles.315 “Such a result would leave in place the very risk of
injury that the exception was intended to eliminate.”316
In the second scenario, a manufacturer undertakes and
completes a recall after a plaintiff files a class action. Under
such circumstances, it is questionable what purpose continued
litigation serves. For this reason, many courts have found that
a class action is rendered moot when the manufacturer has
already addressed the concern through a recall.317 Similarly,
courts have found that the class cannot be certified because it
is not the most efficient means of addressing the claim.318
In the third scenario, plaintiffs’ lawyers opportunistically
file economic loss class actions after a company reports a problem
and undertakes a recall, as occurred when GM addressed
inadvertent deployment of side airbags319 or Toyota updated the
software impacting the anti-lock braking system on certain Prius
and Lexus models.320 In those instances, the manufacturers had
fixed all the affected vehicles, including those of the class
representatives, before settlement of the class action litigation.
Indeed, the district court in the fuel gauge case observed that the
manufacturer had honored every warranty claim made and fully
fixed their vehicles with minimal inconvenience.321 “Is not that the
way consumer society is supposed to work?” the judge asked.322
Allowing the plaintiffs’ lawsuit to proceed, the trial court found,
would “interrupt and distort” an “efficiently operating consumer-

Id.
Id.
317 See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1209,
1211 (10th Cir. 2012); Cheng v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 12-09262 GAF (SHx),
2013 WL 3940815, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2013); In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig.,
270 F.R.D. 377, 384 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 654 F.3d 748 (7th Cir.
2011); In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699, 701 (N.D.
Ga. 2008); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 622
(W.D. Wash. 2003).
318 See, e.g., Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 292 F.R.D. 252, 284 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
(finding class action was not an efficient means of addressing a product defect where
the manufacturer, two months after the filing of the claim, initiated a voluntary recall,
inspected over 300,000 vehicles, and provided a replacement or reinforcement of the
part at issue to about one third of the class members).
319 Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 718-19 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussed
supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text).
320 Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (discussed supra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text). Plaintiffs have similarly filed class actions after a company offers to
correct a problem through a warranty program, as occurred after Mercedes-Benz fixed
faulty fuel sensors. Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 872 A.2d 783, 786 (N.J.
2005) (discussed supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text).
321 Thiedemann, 872 A.2d. at 789 (quoting trial court ruling).
322 Id.
315
316
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complaint and remediation system.”323 It essentially recognized
that claims of this type are often empty suit litigation.
IV.

DECEPTIVE PRODUCT ADVERTISING OR LABELING CLAIMS
WHERE FEW, IF ANY, PEOPLE WERE MISLED

Plaintiffs not only assert creative claims seeking expertdeveloped economic losses resulting from the impact of a
product hazard on the value of a product, they also bring more
traditional deceptive advertising claims where few, if any, of
the class members were misled. This is another type of empty
suit litigation. Such claims occur with respect to a variety of
products, but the trend is exemplified by a recent surge of class
action lawsuits against food makers.324 The principles of
liability and defenses established in this food litigation could
spur, or discourage, similar consumer class actions with respect
to other products.
Most of the current food litigation falls in one of three
categories: (1) claims alleging that a product was advertised as
“all natural,” but arguably contains ingredients that are either
genetically modified or arguably synthetic, and are brought on
behalf of all consumers, many of whom may have purchased
the product for other reasons, such as brand loyalty, price, or
flavor;325 (2) claims that seek recovery for allegedly deceptive
advertising or labeling regarding health benefits where no
reasonable person was misled or experienced a loss;326 and
Id.
See INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM: TRENDS,
TARGETS AND PLAYERS 89 (2013) [hereinafter THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM], available
at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/web-The_New-Lawsuit-EcosystemReport-Oct2013_2.pdf (indicating “nearly 150 food class actions filed [between 2011 and
2013], with more than half filed in California courts”); Vanessa Blum, Welcome to Food
Court,
RECORDER
(Mar.
1,
2013,
1:26
PM),
http://www.linerlaw.com/
NewsMedia/.../portalresource/lookup/wosid/cp-base-4-3324/media.name=/130301.ACA%
20Recorder%20article.pdf (finding that between March 2012 and March 2013 a
network of plaintiffs’ lawyers filed 28 food labeling class actions in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California); Jessica Dye, Food Companies Confront
Spike in Consumer Fraud Lawsuits, THOMSON REUTERS: SUSTAINABILITY (June 13,
2013),
http://sustainability.thomsonreuters.com/2013/06/14/food-companies-confrontspike-in-consumer-fraud-lawsuits/ (citing data compiled by food litigation attorneys at
Perkins Coie that found the number of consumer fraud class actions brought in federal
court against food and beverage companies increased from roughly 19 cases in 2008 to
more than 102 in 2012).
325 See, e.g., Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No. C 10-4387 PJH, 2014
WL 60097, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014) (in which defendant presented evidence that
consumers lacked a common understanding of “all natural” and that “numerous other
factors were more likely to motivate their purchase[ ] ” of ice cream than such labeling).
326 See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., No. 09-CV-1786-L (WMc), 2013 WL 6055326, at
*1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (claim accusing Kellogg of falsely advertising that Mini-Wheats
improved kids’ attentiveness and memory to a degree not supported by competent clinical
323
324
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(3) claims asserting technical violations of food labeling
regulations that likely played no part in consumer purchase
decisions.327 Much of the food litigation involves lawsuits filed
on behalf of many people who did not see or hear the alleged
misrepresentation or did not purchase a product because of it. The
claims frequently assert similar theories of damages discussed with
respect to unmanifested product defect cases.
The greatest area of litigation with respect to food claims
are those alleging that a manufacturer misleadingly advertised a
product as “All Natural.” Consumers may have significantly
different understandings of what qualifies as “all natural,” which
may vary by product. The FDA has struggled with this issue. The
agency abandoned an attempt to regulate “natural” claims in the
late 1980s and into the 1990s, citing resource constraints and
other priorities.328 The FDA’s current policy is that the term
“natural” with respect to food means “nothing artificial or
synthetic (including all color additives regardless of source) has
been included in, or has been added to, a food that would not
normally be expected to be in the food.”329
This informal definition leaves a large gray area. One of
the most common private litigation claims, for example, is that
a manufacturer mislabeled a product as natural when it may
evidence); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 561 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (alleging misleading
advertising related to the healthfulness of Nutella chocolate spread).
327 See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 1, Ivie v. Kraft Foods,
Inc., No. CV 12-02554-RMW (PSG), 2013 WL 8302346, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012)
(in which defendants asserted, in motion to dismiss, that plaintiff ’ s lawyers had
“canvassed reams of arcane federal rules and regulations” in an attempt to identify
statutes the companies have technically violated, and then disingenuously asserted
that their client was misled into buying the products based on those purported
violations); In re Cheerios Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., Civil Action No. 09-cv-2413,
2012 WL 3952069, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2012) (recognizing that plaintiffs filed class
action as a result of a warning letter from FDA to General Mills, informing the
manufacturer that, by advertising Cheerios as lowering cholesterol and preventing
disease, it would need to obtain approval for its product as a drug).
328 See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions,
Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid,
and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302 (Jan. 6, 1993); Food Labeling:
Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms, 56 Fed.
Reg. 60,421, 60,466-67 (Nov. 27, 1991); Food Labeling, 54 Fed Reg. 32,610 (Aug. 8,
1989); see also Termination of Proposed Trade Regulation; Rule of Food Advertising 48
Fed. Reg. 23,270, 23,271 (May 24, 1983) (in which the Federal Trade Commission
abandoned attempt to define “natural” foods).
329 Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions,
Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid,
and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. at 2407; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY BOOK (2005), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/
OPPDE/larc/Policies/Labeling_Policy_Book_082005.pdf (permitting natural claims for
meat and poultry if the product contains (1) no artificial flavor, color, chemical
preservative, or other artificial or synthetic ingredient; (2) is minimally processed; and
(3) the label includes a brief statement explaining the meaning of the term natural).
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contain genetically modified ingredients, such as corn or soy.
This theory provides for almost unlimited litigation, as the
Grocery Manufacturers Association estimates that seventy to
eighty percent of foods on store shelves contain geneticallymodified ingredients.330 Other common “all natural” claims
allege that products contain artificial or synthetic ingredients or
use of processing methods that render the foods unnatural. For
example, there is a spurt of litigation claiming that products,
such as orange juice,331 do not qualify as natural or pure as a
result of their processing.332 Products that contain high fructose
corn syrup also face significant litigation.333
The food litigation is driven by plaintiffs’ lawyers,
advocacy groups with a regulatory agenda, or both. A relatively
small group of law firms have filed most of the cases.334 The
claims are concentrated in California, which is viewed as an ideal
state for such suits because of its expansive consumer protection
laws and relaxed standing requirements.335 In addition, filing in
California allows for large single-state classes,336 which helps
avoid certification complications, since one in eight Americans is a
Californian. Scanning through the litigation reveals some names
over and over, indicating that some law firms recycle the same
330 See
Position
on
GMOs,
GROCERY
MANUFACTURERS
ASS’N,
http://factsaboutgmos.org/disclosure-statement (last visited May 3, 2015) (noting that food
grown using such technology require fewer pesticides and less water, reducing the price of
food and the need for chemicals).
331 See, e.g., Lynch v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-07382 (DMC)(JAD),
2013 WL 2645050, at *10–11 (D.N.J. June 12, 2013) (finding FDA rules did not
preempt state consumer protection, unjust enrichment, and breach of express warranty
claims); Veal v. Citris World, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-801-IPJ, 2013 WL 120761, at *4, *8
(N.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2013) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to pursue claim where he did
not assert that he personally consumed Florida’s Natural orange juice or that he
suffered any ill health effects from consumption of the same, but rather alleges only
that he purchased it, repeatedly); Complaint, Phelps v. Coca-Cola Co., No. BC547592
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 3, 2014), available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/
3/3/v2/33153/06-13-2014-phelps-v-coca-cola-complaint.pdf (asserting claim that “Simply
Orange” products are not “pure” and “fresh”).
332 See Parker v. J.M. Smucker Co., Case No. C 13-0690 SC, 2013 WL 4516156,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss claim alleging labeling of
Crisco cooking oils as “all natural” misled consumers due to the chemical processing the
oils had undergone).
333 See, e.g., Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009)
(reversing district court dismissal of claim on field and conflict preemption grounds
when letter from FDA official advised Snapple that products containing high fructose
corn syrup qualified as natural).
334 See THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM, supra note 324, at 96-98 (compiling
law firms and representative litigation).
335 See, e.g., Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 246 P.3d 877, 901 (Cal. 2011)
(holding that merely purchasing a product is sufficient to establish injury in fact for
purposes of standing under the state’s Unfair Competition Law).
336 See Perry Cooper, False Advertising Suits Over Food Labels Have Peaked,
Plaintiffs’ Attorney Panelist Says, BLOOMBERG L. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS CLASS
ACTION LITIG. REP. (Apr. 25, 2014).
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individuals to serve as representative plaintiffs in class actions
brought against different manufacturers for different types of food
products.337 Although the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
does not authorize a private right of action, these suits have
essentially deputized a cadre of lawyers and groups as the “food
police.” As some of the settlement terms and claims rates confirm,
actual consumer losses do not appear to be a motivating factor.
Judicial treatment of these lawsuits is “inconsistent” at
best. As this section will show, courts have dismissed many of
these claims, particularly when they involve products the
plaintiff did not purchase, representations or labeling that a class
representative did not read or hear before making a purchase,
representations that would not have deceived any reasonable
consumer, labeling that conformed to directly applicable and
specific federal regulations, or matters that are actively under
consideration by a federal agency. These claims also face the
same challenges with respect to class certification as other noinjury claims, such as presenting a viable theory of classwide
damages. While courts dismiss some claims, they have allowed
others to proceed, often with significantly trimmed claims or
class definition.
The overall impression from the quickly developing case
law is that judges recognize that many of these lawsuits are
empty suit claims in search of an injury. The courts are chipping
away at them with the tools available through the constitution,
statutes, common law, and procedural law.
A.

Standing: Is the Plaintiff Suing for Products He or She
Did Not Purchase?

The first hurdle to bringing a lawsuit is a low one—to
show that there is an actual case or controversy, including an
injury-in-fact, which satisfies Article III standing. To meet
337 See THE NEW LAWSUIT ECOSYSTEM, supra note 324, at 91 (citing cases
including Skye Astiana and Kimberly S. Sethavanish). Other examples include Robert
E. Figy and Mary Swearingen, who are named plaintiffs in at least ten class actions
against various food makers filed in the Northern District of California in 2013. See,
e.g., Figy v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-04828 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014); Figy v. FritoLay N. Am., Inc., No. 13-3988 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014); Figy v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc.,
No. C 13-03816 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014); Swearingen v. Attune Foods, Inc., Case No. C
13-04541 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013); Swearingen v. Late July Snacks LLC, No. C-13-4324
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013); Swearingen v. Santa Cruz Natural, Inc., No. C 13-04291
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013); Swearingen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-05322 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 15, 2013); Swearingen v. Amazon Preservation Partners, Inc., Case No. 13cv-04402 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013); Swearingen v. Healthy Beverage, LLC, No. C-1304385 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2013); Swearingen v. Pac. Foods of Or., Inc., Case No. 13-cv04157 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013).
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standing requirements, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an
injury-in-fact that is actual or imminent and “concrete and
particularized . . . not conjectural or hypothetical[,]” (2) that is
“fairly traceable to the [defendant’s] challenged [conduct,]” and
(3) is likely to be redressed by a “favorable judicial decision.”338
Plaintiffs, including those who seek to represent others in a
class action, must allege that they have been personally
injured. It is not sufficient to allege that “injury has been
suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which
they belong and which they purport to represent.”339 It is
common in food class actions for plaintiffs to purchase one
product, but seek to represent a class that purchased a much
broader range of products made by the same company that had
similar qualities or labels.
Courts are fractured as to whether the named plaintiff
must have actually purchased each product that he or she claims
was deceptively marketed to establish the requisite injury-infact.340 Some courts have found plaintiffs lack standing to bring
claims related to products they did not purchase.341 Other courts
have allowed more expansive standing, permitting named
plaintiffs to sue for products that they never bought if the
products and their labeling are “substantially similar” to products
the plaintiff purchased.342
Overall, standing challenges, at best, result in trimming the
number of products at issue in a class action. Plaintiffs’ lawyers

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).
340 See Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (recognizing split and analyzing cases).
341 See, e.g., Garrison v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-05222-VC,
2014 WL 2451290, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2014) (finding named plaintiffs had
standing to bring claims involving products not purchased so long as those products did
not implicate a “significantly different set of concerns” than those bought by the named
plaintiffs); Smedt v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., Case No. 5:12-CV-03029-EJD, 2014 WL
2466881, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (dismissing with prejudice all claims involving
unpurchased products because complaint did not allege facts showing that the
unpurchased products were “substantially similar” to the purchased products); Ivie v.
Kraft Foods, Inc., No. C-12-02554-RMW, 2013 WL 685372, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25,
2013); Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. C 11-05403 JW, 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. July 11, 2012); Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. C 11-05188 SI, 2012 WL 5458396,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 1001044 JSW, 2011 WL 159380, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011).
342 Brazil v. Dole Food Co., Case No. 12-CV-01831-LHK, 2013 WL 5312418, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013); Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 100506 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 890 (N.D.
Cal. 2012); Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., Nos. C-11-2910 EMC, C-11-3164
EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012); Bruno v. Quten Research
Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 530-31 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
338

339
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may also be able to cure an adverse ruling by adding class
representatives who have purchased each variety of the product.343
B.

Failure to State a Claim: Could the Alleged
Misrepresentation Have Plausibly Deceived Consumers?

Courts, at the motion to dismiss stage, occasionally toss
misrepresentation claims that do not pass the “straight face”
test. These are claims where the court finds, as a matter of law,
that no reasonable consumer would be misled by the allegedly
deceptive representation or that allegations that the plaintiff
was misled are implausible. These include lawsuits alleging
that consumers purchased “Sugar in the Raw” with the belief
that the product is completely unprocessed and unrefined344 or
that soy milk comes from a cow.345 Courts have also dismissed
claims asserting that consumers believed that Strawberry and
Raspberry Newton cookies advertised as “made with real fruit”
were made with solid fruit, rather than puree,346 and that
“Cinnamon Blueberry” cereal contained strawberries due to
picture of cereal with fresh strawberries on box.347 Then, there are
the classics. More than one lawsuit has claimed, without success,
that consumers believed Froot Loops contained real fruit,348 or
that “Cap’n Crunch’s Crunch Berries” had “some nutritional
value derived from fruit.”349
Courts have also dismissed cases where the ingredients
listed or other representations on the packaging should have
resolved any ambiguity for consumers regarding terms used by
343 Standing issues also arise when a named plaintiff has experienced an
injury in fact, but files suit on behalf of a broad class that may include uninjured
plaintiffs. See supra note 200. Courts can address such situations not only through
Article III standing, but by the lack of adequacy, typicality, or commonality under class
certification standards.
344 Rooney v. Cumberland Packing Corp., No. 12-CV-0033-H (DHB), 2012 WL
1512106, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).
345 Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., Case No. 13-cv-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013); Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., Case No. 13-cv-01333-WHO, 2013
WL 5513711, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013).
346 Manchouck v. Mondeléz Int’l, No. C 13-02148 WHA, 2013 WL 5400285, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).
347 Shaker v. Nature’s Path Foods, Inc., No. EDCV 13-1138-GW(OPx), 2013
WL 6729802, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal Dec. 16, 2013); see also id. at *3 (finding that no
reasonable consumer would believe that the manufacturer’s use of the word “Optimum”
in product name would lead consumers to believe that the cereal is good for “growth,
reproduction or other vital processes”).
348 Videtto v. Kellogg USA, No. 2:08-cv-01324-MCE-DAD, 2009 WL 1439086,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2009); McKinnis v. Kellogg USA, No. CV 07-2611 ABC (RCx),
2007 WL 4766060, at *4 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 19, 2007).
349 Werbel v. Pepsico, Inc., No. C 09–04456 SBA, 2010 WL 2673860, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. July 2, 2010); see also Sugawara v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-01335-MCE-JFM, 2009
WL 1439115, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2009).
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manufacturers.350 In one such case, involving a claim that pasta
labeled as “All Natural” contained synthetic ingredients, a court
found in granting a motion to dismiss that consumers certainly
must have understood that the product was not “springing fullyformed from Ravioli trees and Tortellini bushes.”351 Similarly, a
court found it “utterly implausible” that reasonable consumers
would take an “undisputedly true statement” about fat content in
pretzels to “draw conclusions about other totally unrelated
nutritional characteristics like sodium content or conclude the
[p]roducts ‘made only positive contributions to a diet.’”352 Clearly, it
should come as no surprise to consumers that pretzels have salt!
Courts have also dismissed claims where the named
plaintiff fails to allege in the complaint that he read the label at
issue before purchasing the product.353 Without such an allegation,
the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant’s alleged conduct
caused a loss. Some courts have considered such an assertion
required to fulfill standing, rather than show causation.354
In addition, courts have occasionally dismissed claims when
the complaint fails to show the named plaintiffs suffered damage
as a result of the alleged violation or deception because they
received what they paid for, i.e. the “benefit of the bargain.”355 They
350 See, e.g., Kelly v. Cape Cod Potato Chip Co., No. 14-00119-CV-W-DW, 2015
WL 363147, at *6, (W.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2015) (“Plaintiff ’ s assertion that she was deceived
by Defendants’ [all natural] labeling is contradicted by the full disclosure of the
challenged ingredients by Defendants.”); Hairston v. South Beach Beverage Co., No. CV
12-1429-JFW (DTBx), 2012 WL 1893818, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) (holding that
Lifewater-maker’s use of “all natural” would not mislead a reasonable consumer because
it was not used “in a vacuum” but followed by statements regarding inclusion of vitamins
and “to the extent there is any ambiguity, it is clarified by the detailed information
contained in the ingredient list, which explains the exact contents of Lifewater”); see also
Chin v. Gen. Mills, Inc., Civil No. 12-2150 (MJD/TNL), 2013 WL 2420455, at *9 (D. Minn.
June 3, 2013); but see Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., No. 12-1586 SC, 2013 WL
1320468, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013) (ingredient list cannot contradict “natural” label).
351 Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
352 Figy v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., Case No. 13-3988 SC, 2014 WL 3953755, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014).
353 See, e.g., Maple v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV-12-5166-RMP, 2013 WL
5885389, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2013) (dismissing second amended complaint, finding
plaintiff could not establish causation where he had not sufficiently claimed that he
actually read the allegedly deceptive claims that the drink contained “natural caffeine” or
that it was a “natural tonic”).
354 See, e.g., Figy v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc., No. CV 13-03816 SI, 2013 WL
6169503, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (finding no standing where plaintiff failed to
allege that he actually read the ingredients before purchasing the products); Johns v.
Bayer Corp., No. 09CV1935 DMS (JMA), 2010 WL 476688, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9,
2010) (Plaintiff “cannot expand the scope of h[er] claims to include a product [s]he did
not purchase or advertisements relating to a product that [s]he did not rely upon”).
355 See, e.g., In re Cheerios Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., Civil Action No. 09cv-2413, 2012 WL 3952069, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2012) (plaintiffs failed to adequately
allege they were entitled to a refund of the full purchase price, had not received the
benefit of the bargain, or were entitled to disgorgement of profits due to representation
that Cheerios reduced cholesterol in violation of FDA regulations); Mason v. Coca-Cola
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have also dismissed claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), which requires pleading causes of action sounding fraud with
particularity, when it is uncertain from the complaint what about
the product the plaintiff found misleading.356
In many instances, however, courts that find plaintiffs
fail to state a claim allow them, in some cases multiple times,
to amend their complaints to correct an identified deficiency.357
C.

Preemption and Regulatory Compliance: Can a Label
Consistent With Government Standards Have Deceived
Consumers?

Preemption and regulatory compliance, often invoked as
defenses in food litigation,358 are relevant to no-injury litigation
because these principles arise in situations in which the federal
agency charged with protecting the public has permitted, or
explicitly authorized, a product’s labeling. Where regulations
provide that a product can or must be advertised in a particular
way, lawsuits that say consumers were misled by such
representations may strain credibility.
As noted earlier, most courts have found “all natural”
claims are not preempted because the FDA has not defined the
term.359 Courts have also found that claims alleging that a
product’s labeling violates a federal regulation or alleges a
theory that is consistent with federal requirements are not
preempted.360 Where a product’s label complies with specific
Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (D.N.J. 2011) (plaintiffs failed to adequately plead facts
showing how they experienced an out-of-pocket loss when they purchased Diet Coke
Plus, which contained added vitamins and minerals as advertised, under the belief it
had greater nutritional value).
356 See, e.g., Mason, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
357 See, e.g., Kane v. Chobani, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (dismissing claim only after plaintiffs failed to state a claim after amending
complaint four times).
358 See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2012)
(preempting states from regulating certain elements of food labeling).
359 See, e.g., Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2009)
(finding claim asserting iced tea is mislabeled as “all natural” when it contains high
fructose corn syrup was not preempted); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Nos.
C 10-4387 PJH, C 10-4937 PJH, 2011 WL 2111796, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2011)
(finding no preemption of “all natural” claims made with respect to ice cream).
360 See, e.g., Lilly v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 743 F.3d 662, 665–66 (9th Cir. 2014)
(reversing dismissal on preemption grounds where claim regarding labeling of sunflower
seed products was consistent with federal regulations requiring disclosure of entire
sodium content); Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 84, 93 (D.N.J. 2011)
(finding claim asserting the mislabeling of low sodium soup was not preempted because it
mirrors federal requirements); Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., No. CV-09-0395 (JG)(RML),
2010 WL 2925955, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010) (finding claim asserting statements
regarding the healthfulness of vitamin water to be misleading was not preempted
because labeling requirements were identical to federal law).
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federal regulations, however, courts have found claims alleging
that the label is deceptive preempted by federal law.361 Recent
examples include claims challenging as deceptive small variations
in transfat content,362 calculation of alcohol content,363 and
calculation of calories364 that the FDA views as acceptable. Courts
have also found that state claims challenging FDA regulations
governing what can be labeled “milk”365 and the use of fruit names
to characterize beverage flavors366 are preempted.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a business
may pursue a Lanham Act claim against a competitor challenging
a food or beverage label that complies with FDCA regulations.367
In that case, Pom Wonderful, a maker and seller of pomegranate
juice products, alleged that Coca-Cola’s name, label, marketing,
and advertising of its Minute Maid pomegranate-blueberry juice
blend was false and misleading. Pom claimed that Coca-Cola
deceptively marketed the product because the labeling prominently
displayed the words “pomegranate blueberry” when the juice blend
was actually 99.4% apple and grape juices, and only 0.3%
pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice.368 Pom sued under
Section 43 of the Lanham Act, which permits a competitor to
sue another for unfair competition arising from false or
misleading product descriptions.369 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the claim, finding that allowing
such a lawsuit, despite extensive FDA regulation of juice
labeling, “would risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments
and authority.”370
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that such claims are not precluded.371 In
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized, “this is not a pre361 See, e.g., Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding
that claim based on representations on the packaging of chewy bars concerning dietary
fiber are preempted).
362 See Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2013);
Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 F. App’x 113, 115 (9th Cir. 2012).
363 See Memorandum Opinion & Order at 4, In re Anheuser-Busch Beer
Labeling Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., Case No. 1:13 MD 02448 (N.D. Ohio June 2,
2014), available at http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/assets/Clerks_Office_and_Court_
Records/MDL/2448/MOO-25.pdf.
364 See Burke v. Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (D.N.J. 2013).
365 See Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., Case No. 13-cv-1953, 2013 WL 6492353,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013).
366 See Hairston v. South Beach Beverage Co., No. CV 12-1429-JFW (DTBx),
2012 WL 1893818, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2012).
367 Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014).
368 Id. at 2235.
369 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
370 Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012),
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
371 Pom Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233.
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emption case.”372 Rather than involving a question of whether a
federal law preempts state law claims, the case turned on
whether regulations promulgated pursuant to a federal law, the
FDCA, precludes private claims alleging deceptive practices
under another federal statute, the Lanham Act.373 The Court
recognized that although the Nutritional Labeling and
Education Act preempts certain state laws regarding food and
beverage labeling, Congress did not preclude suits arising under
other federal laws.374 The Court concluded that there was no
“irreconcilable conflict” between the two federal laws, finding
that “[a]lthough both statutes touch on food and beverage
labeling, the Lanham Act protects commercial interests against
unfair competition, while the FDCA protects public health and
safety.”375 The Court took care to note that the variation
permitted by claims under the Lanham Act with respect to fair
competition is “quite different from the disuniformity that would
arise from the multitude of state laws, state regulations, state
administrative agency rulings, and state-court decisions that are
partially forbidden by the FDCA’s pre-emption provision.”376
Some lawyers view the high court’s rejection of a broad
regulatory compliance defense in Pom Wonderful as supportive of
private consumer class actions against food makers.377 Plaintiffs’
lawyers are likely to frequently cite Pom Wonderful when
opposing motions to dismiss on preemption or regulatory
compliance grounds. Other observers anticipate that, although
the decision may inspire more Lanham Act lawsuits between
competitors, Pom Wonderful’s narrow holding is unlikely to have
a major impact on the surge of food class action litigation.378
Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2237.
374 Id. at 2238.
375 Id. at 2237-38.
376 Id. at 2239-40.
377 See Emily Kokoll, Attys React to High Court’s Pom v. Coke Lanham Act
Ruling, LAW360 (June 12, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547491/
attys-react-to-high-court-s-pom-v-coke-lanham-act-ruling (quoting reaction of several
attorneys to ruling). Cf. Adam M. Reich et al., POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola
Company: Have the Tides Turned in the Legal Food Fight?, PAUL HASTINGS (June 1,
2014),
http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=3a7fe169-23346428-811c-ff00004cbded (commenting that POM Wonderful “may increase consumer
litigation as class proponents seek to pile on the litigation efforts of the corporate
competitors” or could shift the litigation from consumers versus manufacturer to
competitor versus competitor).
378 See Glenn G. Lammi, Quick Take: Some Possible Impacts of SCOTUS’s
POM Wonderful Decision on State-Law Food Labeling Class Actions, FORBES (June 13,
2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/06/13/quick-take-some-possibleimpacts-of-scotuss-pom-wonderful-decision-on-state-law-food-labeling-class-actions/
(noting that language in the opinion suggests that it will not impact arguments that
the FDCA preempts state-law class actions challenging food labels).
372
373
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Primary Jurisdiction: Can a Court Find an Aspect of a
Label Deceptive When a Government Agency is Better
Equipped to Make Such a Determination?

The primary jurisdiction doctrine provides courts with
another means to dismiss claims where the labeling deficiency
asserted is often technical, unsettled, or policy-based, and does
not involve a representation that is likely to have injured
consumers.379 Some courts have applied the doctrine to stay or
dismiss food labeling and advertising claims, finding that the
FDA is best suited to determine if labeling terms are acceptable
or misleading.380
The primary jurisdiction doctrine permits courts to defer
to agencies to decide issues that are either within that agency’s
specialized sphere of knowledge or where there is a need for a
uniform answer from a single agency rather than a multitude of
answers from various courts.381 A court can apply the doctrine to
stay proceedings or dismiss a complaint as it awaits guidance
from the agency through a formal regulation or informal
guidance.382 Courts have applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine
to stay or dismiss claims when an agency is actively considering
the issue raised in the litigation. For example, courts have
applied the doctrine to preclude deceptive marketing claims
challenging a manufacturer’s computation of the serving size for
mints383 or whether yogurt qualifies as “Greek.”384
The impact of the doctrine is illustrated by litigation
regarding use of the term “evaporated cane juice,” a term that
plaintiffs have asserted in at least fifty class actions hides
sugar content from consumers.385 After the FDA reopened the
379 Unlike federal preemption, the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not require
a conflict between a state law claim and a particular regulation or evidence that Congress
sought to displace state regulation. See id.
380 See generally Cary Silverman, I’ll See You in the Agency! ‘Primary
Jurisdiction’ Gains Ground As a Defense for Regulated Industries, 31 LJN PROD. LIAB.
LAW & STRATEGY, May 2013, at 1, 3-4, 6.
381 See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
382 See id. at 63-64; Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th
Cir. 2008).
383 See Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. C-12-02554-RMW, 2013 WL
685372, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013).
384 See Taradejna v. Gen. Mills Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-35 (D. Minn. 2012).
385 See Glenn G. Lammi, FDA Action Should Take the Juice Out of Some Food
Labeling Class Actions, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/
03/04/fda-action-should-take-the-juice-out-of-some-food-labeling-class-actions/. They do
so on the basis of an FDA guidance document entitled “Draft Guidance for Industry:
Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice,” drafted in 2009 but never finalized,
that informed the industry that “dried cane syrup,” not evaporated cane juice, is the
common name under federal rules for “the solid or dried form of sugar cane syrup.”
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comment period on a long pending rulemaking on March 4,
2014,386 several courts stayed such claims387 or dismissed them
without prejudice.388 These courts recognized that “[d]eferring
to the FDA for resolution of these issues will enhance decisionmaking and efficiency by allowing the court to take advantage
of administrative expertise.”389
By way of contrast, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
not likely to stem the tide of “all natural” claims. In 2013, two
federal judges entered six-month stays and another judge
administratively terminated claims alleging that manufacturers
could not label products as natural when they contain genetically
modified ingredients.390 The FDA declined invitations from the
judges to address the issue.391 In a January 2014 letter, an
agency official explained that developing such a definition
would require a public notice and comment process and require
input from other federal agencies such as the U.S. Department
Draft Guidance for Industry: Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice, 74 Fed.
Reg. 51,610 (Oct. 7, 2009).
386 Draft Guidance for Industry on Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane
Juice; Reopening of Comment Period; Request for Comments, Data and Information, 79
Fed. Reg. 12,507 (Mar. 5, 2014). Through its official notice, the FDA acknowledged that it
had not reached any final decision on the usual name for evaporated cane juice but noted
that “[a]fter reviewing the comments received, [it] intend[s] to revise draft guidance, if
appropriate, and issue it in final form.” id. at 12,508.
387 See, e.g., Figy v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc., No. C 13-03816-SI, 2014 WL 3362178
(N.D. Cal. July 7, 2014); Gitson v. Clover Stornetta Farms, No. C-13-01517(EDL), 2014
WL 2638203, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2014); Swearingen v. Attune Foods, Inc., Case No.
C13-4541 SBA, 2014 WL 2094016 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2014), vacated, 2015 WL 370167
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2015); Figy v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04828-TEH, 2014
WL 1779251, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014); Swearingen v. Santa Cruz Natural Inc., No.
C 13-04291 SI, 2014 WL 1339775, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014), judgment set aside, 2014
WL 2967585 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2014); Reese v. Odwalla, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 935, 937
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
388 See, e.g., Saubers v. Kashi Co., Case No. 13CV899 JLS (BLM), 2014 WL 3908595
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014).
389 Figy v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc., No. C-13-03816-SI, 2014 WL 1379915, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), judgment set aside on other grounds, 2014 WL 3362178 (N.D.
Cal. July 7, 2014). Some courts, however, have denied motions to dismiss or stay similar
claims on primary jurisdiction grounds. See, e.g., Pratt v. Whole Foods Mkt. Cal., Inc.,
Case No. 5:12-CV-05652-EJD, 2014 WL 1324288, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014);
Leonhart v. Nature’s Path Foods, Inc., Case No. 5:13-CV-0492-EJD, 2014 WL 1338161, at
*6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014).
390 See, e.g., In re Gen. Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., Civ. Action No. 12-249(KM),
2013 WL 5943972, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013) (administratively terminating case); Barnes v.
Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. July 25,
2013) (staying litigation for six-months); Cox v. Gruma Corp., Case No. 12-CV-6502 YGR,
2013 WL 3828800, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (staying litigation for six-months); see also
Astiana v. Hain Celestrial Grp., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016-17 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(declining to make an independent determination on whether manufacturer’s use of
“natural” on cosmetic labels was false or misleading in absence of FDA rules, regulations, or
informal policy guidance on the issue).
391 Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., to Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, Hon. Jeffrey S. White, and Hon. Kevin
McNulty (Jan. 6, 2014).
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of Agriculture.392 The official also noted that if federal agencies
were to define the term “natural,” they would need to examine:
relevant science; consumer preferences, perceptions, and beliefs; the
vast array of modern food production technologies in addition to
genetic engineering (e.g., use of different types of fertilizer, growth
promotion drugs, animal husbandry methods); the myriad food
processing methods (e.g., nanotechnology, thermal technologies,
pasteurization, irradiation); and any strictures flowing from the
First Amendment.393

The official concluded that, due to limited resources and higher
priorities, the FDA could not undertake such an effort.394
The gap left by the FDA’s unwillingness to define what
products qualify as natural virtually eliminates the ability to
successfully assert “primary jurisdiction” as a defense in such
litigation. With primary jurisdiction lost, and courts unlikely to
find preemption, plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to bring class
actions on behalf of all consumers who purchased “natural”
products, including those who were not misled, bought the
product for reasons unrelated to such labeling, and consumed
the food and drinks for which they paid without incident.
Judges and jurors in individual cases will be left to decide an
issue that the FDA found too complex to address.
E.

Class Certification: Is there a Common Injury or
Damages?

As with other no-injury claims, denying class certification
is another means by which courts have effectively disposed of
many lawsuits against food makers brought on behalf of many
people who were not misled when purchasing a product.
Demonstrating that common questions of law or fact
predominate, as required by Rule 23(b)(3), is a particular
challenge where consumers may have purchased a product for a
myriad of reasons other than its labeling or a representation in a
particular advertisement. This is one basis upon which courts
have rejected certification of “all natural” classes.395 As the FDA’s

See id.
Id. at 2.
394 Id. The FDA issued an informal policy statement in 1992 taking the position
that genetically modified foods do not “differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform
way, or that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or
greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.” Statement of
Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,991 (May 29, 1992).
395 See, e.g., Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 12-01633 CRB, 2014 WL
2702726, at *16-18 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014); Caldera v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. CV 12-4936392

393
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decision not to define the phrase shows, the determination is
complex and is as much a matter of science, technology, and
public policy as a matter of law. Given that the agency charged
with regulating food labeling cannot offer a reasoned definition
of natural, attorneys may be hard pressed to show that
consumers had a common understanding of the term. As a
federal district court in New York found in denying class
certification of a claim that pre-mixed “SkinnyGirl Margarita” was
not “all natural” because it contained the preservative sodium
benzoate and a tequila byproduct, the typicality requirement
“prevent[s] a false prophet from bearing the standard for an entire
class of claims.”396
Certification motions have also failed when the proposed
class includes consumers nationwide or in multiple states.
Defense lawyers argue, and most courts have agreed, that
significant differences in the various states’ consumer fraud and
warranty laws preclude nationwide class certification.397 Courts
have permitted attorneys to avoid this complication by certifying
single-state cases, often under California law.398 In addition,
several courts have denied certification on the ground that a
proposed class is not ascertainable because of the inability to
identify members who purchased a food product due to allegedly
misleading labeling.399

GHK (VBKx), 2014 WL 1477400, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014); Rapcinsky v. Skinnygirl
Cocktails, L.L.C., No. 11 Civ. 6546(JPO), 2013 WL 93636 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013).
396 Rapcinsky, 2013 WL 93636, at *5.
397 See Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-02890-H (BGS), 2013 WL
5664985, at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 30, 2013) (denying nationwide class certification due to
material differences between state consumer protection laws); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
No. CV 10-1028-GW(ARGx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (denying
class certification in part because Plaintiffs attempted to apply California law to the
claims of out-of-state class members).
398 See, e.g., Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, Case No. 12-CV-2724-LHK,
2014 WL 2191901, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (certifying a class of California
consumers, but not nationwide, in a claim alleging false labeling of almond milk products
as containing evaporated cane juice and being “all natural”); Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291
F.R.D. 493, 509-10 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (certifying a class of California consumers in claim
alleging false labeling of “all natural” products); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 561
(S.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a class of California consumers in a claim alleging misleading
advertising related to the healthfulness of Nutella spread).
399 See, e.g., In re Pom Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML
10-02199 DPP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014) (denying
certification in part because there was no way to reliably determine who purchased
Defendant’s beverages or when they did so); Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition Co.,
Case No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 WL 580696, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (finding
plaintiffs presented no administratively feasible method for weeding out inaccurate or
fraudulent claims); see also Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL
815253 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014) (noting that the plaintiff “failed to propose a realistic
method of identifying” those who purchased a dietary supplement).
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Certification of food class actions where an actual injury
is dubious also faces challenges due to the need to show
classwide damages that stem from the defendants’ actions that
created the liability.400 Similar to economic loss claims
involving automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and other products,
plaintiffs have presented damages models such as a (1) fullrefund model, (2) price-premium model, and (3) regression
model.401 Courts have found that a full refund is an inappropriate
measure of damages since at least some class members, if not all,
received some benefit from consuming the food.402 The pricepremium model, which relies on expert testimony to show the
“true value” of an accurately labeled product would be lower
than the purchase price, often fails in food and other class actions
because of the difficulty of linking a price difference to the allegedly
misleading label, as opposed to other reasons why comparable
products may have different prices.403 Some courts have accepted
regression models, which estimate a manufacturer’s gains from an
alleged misrepresentation by examining sales of a product before
and after inclusion of the disputed term and attempt to control
for other variables that could otherwise explain changes in the
products sales.404 A plaintiff’s abject failure to explain how
consumers suffered a loss has led courts to decertify classes and
grant summary judgment.405
Despite these and other challenges, some courts have
certified food class actions in which many consumers likely did not
400 See, e.g., Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., No. C 10-4387 PJH, 2014
WL 60097, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014) (rejecting class certification in a case
challenging “all natural” ice-cream labels based in part on insufficient proof of damages).
401 See Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, No 12-CV-01831, 2014 WL 2466559,
at *15 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014).
402 See, e.g., Caldera v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. CV 12-4936-GHK (VBKx), 2014 WL
1477400, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014); In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014).
403 See, e.g., Dole Packaged Foods, 2014 WL 2466559, at *16 (finding that a price
difference can be explained by factors other than the alleged label misrepresentations);
Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No. C-12-2646-RMW, 2014 WL 1652338, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 24, 2014) (denying certification because plaintiff did not factor in reasons other than
the promised antioxidant health benefits in the difference between the price of teas);
Caldera, 2014 WL 1477400, at *4 (finding that “the true value of the products to consumers
likely varies depending on the individual consumer’s motivation for purchasing the products
at issue”); see also Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 59 (Ill. 2005) (Karmeier, J.,
joined by Fitzgerald, J., concurring) (finding class action alleging consumers were misled by
marketing of cigarettes as “light” failed because plaintiffs sustained no actual damages
when there was no price difference between light and other cigarettes).
404 See Dole Packaged Foods, 2014 WL 2466559, at *17.
405 See Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, No. 10-01139 RS, 2013 WL
1287416, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (granting summary judgment and decertifying
case where plaintiffs had not produced a “scintilla of evidence” after discovery from
which a fact finder could properly measure restitution in a claim alleging that iced tea
containing high fructose corn syrup and citric acid did not qualify as natural).
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experience an injury from the contested labeling.406 For example,
the Southern District of California certified a class of California
consumers that claimed that Ferrero misleadingly promoted its
Nutella spread as part of a healthy and nutritious breakfast,407
even though consumers were purchasing a hazelnut chocolate
spread, a food universally known as a sweet dessert item.
F.

Will Recent Settlements Feed the Litigation?

When cases survive motions to dismiss, companies have
chosen to settle them rather than proceed to trial. Unlike the
Whirlpool class action, it does not appear that any of the food
labeling claims have resulted in a judgment. Several such cases
have recently resulted in multi-million dollar settlements.408
These settlements are all but certain to spur continued litigation.
The claims underlying the settlements raise questions
as to whether consumers were actually harmed by the allegedly
deceptive conduct. For example, as a result of an advertisement
of the chocolate hazelnut spread Nutella as part of a healthy
breakfast, consumers were eligible to receive $4 for each jar

406 See, e.g., Dole Packaged Foods, 2014 WL 2466559, at *20 (certifying a class
alleging misleading advertising on various fruit products displaying the term “allnatural”); Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, Case No. 12-CV-2724-LHK, 2014
WL 2191901, at *20–21 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (certifying California class in claim
alleging false labeling of almond milk products as containing evaporated cane juice and
being “all natural”); Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 509-10 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
(certifying a class of California consumers in claim alleging false labeling of “all
natural” food products).
407 In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 556 (S.D. Cal. 2011). The U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey later certified a similar nationwide class for
settlement purposes. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Settlement,
Preliminarily Certifying Settlement Class & Approving Class Notice at 2-3, In re
Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 11-1086(FLW)(DEA) (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2012).
408 See, e.g., Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement,
Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 3:11-cv-05188-WHO (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2014) ($3.4 million
settlement in lawsuit accusing Trader Joe’s of falsely advertising products such as cookies,
cinnamon rolls, buttermilk biscuits and apple juice as “all natural”); Dennis v. Kellogg Co.
No. 09-CV-1786-L (WMc), 2013 WL 6055326 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) ($4 million settlement
in lawsuit claiming misleading advertising about the health benefits of cereal for children);
Order Re Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Pappas v. Naked
Juice Co., No. LA CV11-08276 JAK (PLAx) (C.D. Cal., Aug. 7, 2013) ($9 million settlement
in lawsuit claiming that Naked Juice Co. mislabeled juice products as “all natural”); Order
Granting Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, Johnson v. Gen. Mills, No. SACV 1000061-CJC(ANx), (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) ($8.5 million settlement in lawsuit accusing
General Mills of making misleading digestive health claims about its yogurts); Settlement
Agreement at ¶ H, Kelley v. PopChips Inc., Case No. 1316-CV11037 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Nov. 14,
2013), available at https://popchipssettlement.com/Portals/0/Documents/Exhibit%20A%20—
%20Settlement%20Agreement%20%28File%20Stamped%29%20%2800033638%29.pdf
($2.4 million settlement in lawsuit accusing Popchips of misleading consumers by using the
term “all natural” on its label).
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purchased, but no more than $20.409 They could do so regardless
of whether they saw the ad or purchased the product because of
it, or even if they were fully aware of the calories and fat fully
disclosed on the product’s label. Likewise, consumers who
purchased Frosted Mini-Wheats were eligible to receive $5 for
each box of cereal purchased, up to $15, based on the $4 million
settlement of a class action lawsuit accusing Kellogg of falsely
advertising that Mini-Wheats improved kids’ attentiveness,
memory, and other cognitive functions to a degree not supported
by competent clinical evidence.410 Consumers were eligible to file a
claim regardless of their awareness of the allegedly misleading
statement or whether increasing a kids’ attentiveness by 20%
rather than 11% was a factor in purchasing the cereal.411 Red Bull
recently agreed to establish a $13 million fund to settle a class
action alleging the slogan “Red Bull gives you wings” misled
consumers to believe the products provided significant benefits
over a cup of coffee or caffeine pill.412 Anyone who purchased the
energy drinks in the last twelve years is eligible to receive $10
cash or two free Red Bull products valued at $15—no proof of
purchase (or actual deception) required.413
While consumers who fill out the necessary paperwork in
such settlements eventually receive a small payment, plaintiffs’
attorneys often collect millions in fees.414 For example, Kellogg

409 See Class Action Settlement Agreement ¶ 48, In re Ferrero Litig., Case No.
11-CV-205 H (CAB) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012); Class Action Settlement Agreement ¶ 48,
In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., Civil Action No. 3:11-cv-01086-FLW-DEA
(D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2012).
410 See Dennis v. Kellogg Co., Case No. 09-CV-1786-L (WMc), 2013 WL 6055326,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013).
411 See Maria Godoy, No, Frosted Mini-Wheats Won’t Make Your Kids Smarter,
NPR (May 30, 2013, 4:20 PM), www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/05/30/187330235/nofrosted-mini-wheats-don-t-make-your-kids-smarter.
412 Class Action Complaint at 2, Careathers v. Red Bull N. Am. Inc., Case No.
1:13-cv-00369-KPF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2013).
413 See generally Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of the Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Careathers v. Red Bull N.
Am. Inc., Nos. 1:13-CV-0369 (KPF), 1:13-cv-08008 (KPF), (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2014)
[hereinafter Red Bull Settlement].
414 See Order Granting Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Awarding Class
Representative Incentive Awards, In re Quaker Oats Labeling Litig., Case No. 5:10-CV00502-RS (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2014) (approving settlement agreement including $760,000
in attorney’s fees while consumers, other than class representatives who received $750
incentive awards, received no monetary recovery); Stipulation of Settlement at 6, 11,
Astiana v. Kashi Co., Case No. 11 CV 1967 H (BGS) (S.D. Cal., May 2, 2014) [hereinafter
Kashi Settlement] (noting that up to $1.25 million of the $5 million settlement funds
went to the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees); Order re Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement, Pappas v. Naked Juice Co., Case No. LA CV11-08276 JAK (PLAx)
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013) (approving up to $3.12 million of $9 million settlement for
attorneys’ fees and costs); Dennis v. Kellogg Co., No. 09-CV-1786-L (WMc), 2013 WL
6055326 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013), at *1 (allocating $1 million of the $4 million settlement
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Company agreed to settle claims that its Kashi line’s use of “All
Natural” on certain products was false and misleading for
$5 million.415 Under the terms of the settlement, class members
with receipts may seek reimbursement of $.50 for each product
purchased, up to a maximum of $25. The settlement also provides
that plaintiffs’ counsel may seek $1.25 million in attorneys’ fees.416
Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the Red Bull suit stand to receive $4.75
million, which the company has agreed to pay on top of the
settlement fund.417
Judges are showing increased willingness to reject
proposed settlements that do not provide a significant benefit
to consumers harmed by the allegedly deceptive conduct or that
primarily benefit the lawyers involved.418 For example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the first
settlement proposed in the Frosted Mini-Wheats case. The court
initially found that the proposed $10.5 million settlement would
provide the plaintiffs’ lawyers with approximately $2 million in
fees and costs, the equivalent of $2,100 per hour, while the
settlement offered class members, at most, $15 from a $2.75
million fund.419 The court withdrew that opinion, removing most
criticism of the attorneys’ fees. Instead, the reissued opinion
focused on the inadequacy of the settlement due to its cy pres
award, which would distribute about half of the settlement
value, $5.5 million in goods, to food charities, a cause that had
to attorney’s fees and expenses, with another $900,000 allocated for claims notice and
administration costs).
415 Kashi Settlement, supra note 414, at 6.
416 See id.
417 Red Bull Settlement, supra note 413, at 10.
418 See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Class
counsel shed crocodile tears over Rexall’s misrepresentations, describing them as
‘demonstrably false’ . . . . Yet only one-fourth of one percent of these fraud victims will
receive even modest compensation, and for a limited period the labels will be changed, in
trivial respects unlikely to influence or inform consumers. And for conferring these
meager benefits class counsel should receive almost $2 million?”); Eubank v. Pella Corp.,
753 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding proposed settlement of class action was
“inequitable–even scandalous” in providing greater benefit to plaintiffs’ attorneys than
consumers); Order re: Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Henderson v. J.M.
Smucker Co., No. CV 10-4524-GHK (VBKx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (rejecting request
for $3.3 million in attorneys’ fees claim as “grossly excessive” in light of what she actually
achieved and awarding approximately $92,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs); Andrew
Scurria, Ben & Jerry’s Sinks Class Cert. In: ‘All Natural’ Label Suit, LAW360 (Jan. 7,
2014, 7:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/499365/ben-jerry-s-sinks-class-cert-in-allnatural-label-suit (reporting that the court in Astiana v. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, No.
10-cv-4387 (N.D. Cal.) rejected a $7.5 million settlement because of the proposed
settlement amount, $36,080 was claimed as recovery by the class and $7.4 million were
allocated as a cy pres remedy which, as unclaimed funds, would revert to a foundation for
improving hygiene and nutrition run by Ben & Jerry’s corporate parent Unilever PLC,
and that the court subsequently denied class certification).
419 See Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, withdrawn and superseded, 697
F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
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no connection to the harmed consumers.420 On remand, the
district court increased the consumer fund to $4 million,
reduced the attorneys’ fees to $1 million, set aside $900,000 for
claims notice and administration costs, and allocated any
unclaimed funds to consumer advocacy groups.421
Another example is the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of a
settlement stemming from Radio Shack’s inclusion of a portion of
the expiration date of credit cards on receipts, giving rise to
statutory damages under federal law.422 While lawyers
representing the class would receive $1 million in fees, class
members would receive $10 coupons valid for use in the store for
a six-month period.423 Judge Posner found the agreed-upon
attorneys’ fees “grossly disproportionate” to the “meager value”
provided to consumers.424
Extremely low claims rates also indicate that there is
little benefit to plaintiffs in these consumer class actions.425
According to a 2013 analysis by a settlement administrator,
Kurtzman Carson Consultants, the claims rates for settlements
handled by her firm in which class members received notice
through the media ranged from “.002% [to] 9.378%, with a
median rate of .023%.”426 Products in the analysis included
toothpaste, heating pads, gift cards, snack food, and sunglasses.427
Another recent study, conducted by a defense firm, found that of
six cases for which settlement distribution data was publicly
available, half delivered less than 2% of their funds to class
members.428 The analysis found that plaintiffs used the cy pres
doctrine to inflate the purported size of the benefit to the class
in order to justify attorneys’ fees that often exceeded the amount
distributed directly to the class.429 Such low claim rates may
Dennis, 697 F.3d at 869.
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., No. 09-CV-1786-L (WMc), 2013 WL 6055326, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013).
422 See Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 627, 640 (7th Cir. 2014)
(rejecting settlement of claim under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(FACTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g), which authorizes statutory damages of between $100
and $1,000 without the need to show actual harm).
423 See id. at 638-39.
424 Id. at 632.
425 See Alison Frankel, A Smoking Gun in Debate Over Consumer Class
Actions?, REUTERS (May 9, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/05/09/asmoking-gun-in-debate-over-consumer-class-actions/ (last visited May 3, 2015).
426 See Decl. of Deborah McComb re Settlement Claims at 2, Poertner v.
Gillette Co., Case No. 6:12-CV-00803-GAP-DAB (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2014) (declaration
of Senior Consultant at Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC).
427 Id.
428 See Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?: An Empirical Analysis of Class
Actions, MAYER BROWN LLP (2013), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/
Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf.
429 Id. at 10-11.
420
421
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suggest that consumers did not believe they were injured. The
attorneys who bring such claims are empty suits, purporting to
represent clients who were not harmed.
CONCLUSION
Overall, courts are maintaining objective criteria for
pure emotional harm claims based on subjective anxiety and
fears, though gradually expanding the opportunity for recovery.
Courts are largely rejecting claims based on speculative future
injuries that may never develop or that rely on purely expertdriven theories of economic losses. Most claims seeking
payments for medical testing costs by those who have no
physical injury are either rejected, as exemplified by the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Coronia, or subject to
safeguards intended to require an objective indication of injury
and that any money awarded is actually used for scientificallywarranted medical testing. Courts appear to uniformly dismiss
claims alleging that patients are due full or partial refunds for
prescription drugs they took that benefited them. Courts either
find that such lawsuits are product liability claims without injury
masquerading as consumer protection suits or that the plaintiffs
have no claim because they received the benefit of the bargain.
Most judges recognize that drivers are not entitled to a “problem
free” car and view the recall process as the most efficient and
effective means to address mechanical issues when they arise.
Courts appear to be chipping away at the surge of class action
litigation brought on behalf of many people who happily ate or
drank their purchases and only later discovered they were
members of a class action lawsuit. Comcast v. Behrend provides
courts with a new tool to address no-injury lawsuits through
denying class certification of consumer class actions that rely on
damage calculations that do not fit the actual harm.
Nevertheless, nearly every day the media reports another
sensational claim along these lines. As long as companies
occasionally settle such lawsuits at multi-million and multi-billion
dollar levels, plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to file them. It is far
easier to assert an economic loss class action on behalf of everyone
who purchased a product who was not injured, than take part
in the heavily competitive market that has developed for
recruiting people who may have been actually harmed by it.430
430 See Paul M. Barrett, Need Victims for Your Mass Lawsuit? Call Jesse
Levine, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-12-12/mass-tort-lawsuit-lead-generator-jesse-levine-has-victims-for-sale
(examining the mass tort lead generation business).
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As the food litigation shows, it takes little effort to recycle the
same individuals as representative plaintiffs and allegations to
another product. The FDA’s reluctance to provide clarity in
labeling obligations leaves the door wide open to misrepresentation
claims. And while Comcast appears to be gaining a foothold,
plaintiffs’ lawyers may adapt by relying on issue-classes or laws
that authorize statutory damages,431 eliminating the need to show
a classwide theory of damages.
Ironically, these types of lawsuits may do more to harm
consumers than help them. Unnecessary medical monitoring
lawsuits may lead to anxiety and, for those who obtain testing,
false positives. The media scare stemming from a slew of
lawsuits that exaggerate the risk of injury from a safety concern
with a car may do more to harm the brand and shareholder
value than the problem itself.432 This leads to a chicken-and-theegg question. Did the potential defect lower the resale value of
the car or did the lawsuit making such allegations do so?
Excessive drug litigation has its own side effects. Learning of
such lawsuits may lead patients to not take a drug that their
physician believes would provide them with significant benefits
and pose little risk.433 At worst, it could spur a patient to
immediately stop using a drug without consulting a doctor,
which itself could cause harm.434 The food lawsuits not only
attempt to turnout the pockets of mega-corporations, but also
431 See generally Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of
Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 113-14 (2009) (observing
that plaintiffs are increasingly combining claims for statutory damages with class
actions in litigation under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, Cable Communications Policy Act, Fair Credit Reporting
Act, and state consumer protection acts).
432 See Ed Wallace, The Real Scandal Behind the Toyota Recall, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/lifestyle/content/feb2010/
bw20100211_986136.htm (examining several prior auto defect allegations that were
overblown in the media and destroyed the value of the cars at issue).
433 See generally Daniel M. Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising May Be
Hazardous to Your Health! A Call to Fairly Balance Commercial Solicitation of Clients
in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 319 (2014). For example,
psychiatrists have reported that patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have
requested a medication change, or stop taking the medication, because the drug was
targeted in lawyer ads. See New Survey Shows Product Liability Litigation May
Jeopardize Treatment Outcomes for People with Severe Mental Illnesses, ELI LILLY &
CO. (June 13, 2007), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=248836
(discussing results of survey conducted jointly by Eli Lilly and the National Council for
Community Behavioral Healthcare).
434 See, e.g., Evan Levine, M.D., Your Medication Can Kill You; Call Your
Lawyer!, LEFTIST REV. (May 19, 2012), http://www.leftistreview.com/2012/05/19/yourmedication-can-kill-you-call-your-lawyer/evanlevine/ (in which the author, a cardiologist
in New York, discusses a patient who, after watching a television advertisement
portraying the blood thinner, Pradaxa, as problematic and dangerous, stopped using the
drug, placing himself at risk of a stroke, because he was concerned that the drug could
“cause him to hemorrhage to death”).
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harm family-owned, socially-responsible businesses.435 While
few consumers actually apply for the limited payment that the
occasional settlement provides, they all share the cost of litigation
in the grocery store’s checkout counter, at the dealership, and in
their health and auto insurance rates, through less consumer
choice, and damage to the economy.436 In addition, settlement of
empty suit litigation is likely to provide a windfall to the many
class members who did not experience an injury while
substantially undervaluing the claims of the few individuals
who actually experienced an economic loss.
There is no single solution to “empty suit” litigation. What
is clear is that the societal costs of these lawsuits outweigh their
benefits. Courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures share
responsibility in putting an end to such litigation.
Courts should dismiss claims at the earliest opportunity
where the alleged injury is a creation of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Judges
should abandon their reluctance to use the tools available to them
to address claims that go well beyond reasonableness. Through
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, state equivalents of that rule,
and other applicable statutes, they have the discretion to impose
sanctions, including attorneys’ fees and costs, on plaintiffs’
lawyers whose suits do not pass the “straight face” test and who
are “frequent filers,” cutting-and-pasting the same claims against
different companies and products often reusing the same
individuals as class representatives in the hope that one will
stick and draw a settlement. Where the parties settle such
claims, courts should keep a watchful eye to ensure that class
members, not just class counsel and charities selected by the
parties, receive a tangible benefit from the litigation.
Courts should also recognize what while line drawing in
the area of emotional harm recovery may seem arbitrary and
occasionally lead to results that seem unfair, such objective
constraints are essential to placing bounds on an otherwise
limitless tort. Courts should also understand that tort law is ill
suited to address product safety concerns before an injury occurs.
That is why Congress established regulatory agencies such as the
CPSC, NHTSA, and FDA. It understood that tort law “comes in
too late.” An agency oversight, regulation, and intervention can
435 See, e.g., Laurent Belsie, Nutella Settles Lawsuit. You Can Get $20.,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/neweconomy/2012/0427/Nutella-settles-lawsuit.-You-can-get-20 (discussing lawsuit against
Ferrero).
436 See JOANNA M. SHEPHERD-BAILEY, AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION,
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS OR CONSUMER LITIGATION ACTS?: A HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF STATE CPAS 21 (2013), available at http://www.consumerlawsunhinged.org/
consumer-protection-acts-or-consumer-litigation-acts/.
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protect the public before a person is injured from a product
hazard. While the recall process is not flawless and relies on selfreporting, in most cases, the system is more efficient and effective
than litigation. Those agencies should have the resources and
tools they need to police reporting and recall obligations. With
respect to advertising and labeling, government agencies can
eliminate empty suit litigation by setting clear rules that support
preemption of common law claims. An FDA regulation governing
the use of “natural” in food and cosmetic advertising, for example,
could put an end to about one hundred class actions. The
alternative to such national standards is the status quo of
inconsistent outcomes and settlements in seemingly neverending, case-by-case litigation.
State legislatures also have a role. When necessary to
address abuse, they can set standards for when medical
monitoring is permissible, tighten consumer protection statutes
to make clear that individuals must have an actual injury
before bringing a claim, and preclude the combination of the
class action mechanism and statutory damages, two tools
intended to incentivize small claims that, when joined, expose
companies to extraordinary liability regardless of whether
anyone was actually injured.
Our courts and the civil justice system should be preserved
for real and meritorious claims, not empty suit litigation.

